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Abstract 
 
“The Role of PMCs (Private Military Companies) in Counter-insurgency Combat in Afghanistan (2001 
to 2010)” aims to identify the primary combat roles which PMCs played while in support of U.S. forces 
during the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan from 2001-2010. It first provides background 
on a number of issues, including U.S. legal and policy themes regarding PMCs, their previous use in 
combat situations while supporting U.S. foreign policy goals, and the insurgency and 
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It finds while overall there is a relative dearth of 
information regarding PMCs in combat for a number of identified reasons, PMCs did engage in combat 
in a number of roles, specifically while conducting mobile, static, and personal security functions. 
Analysis of the environment and circumstances in which PMCs engaged in combat bring up a number 
of broader themes which are highlighted, these generally involve negative impacts on the overall 
counterinsurgency campaign. Although limited by information constraints, it is seen that by 
empowering and legitimizing local warlords, indirectly funding Taliban operations and alienating local 
populations, PMCs have in various instances undermined the counterinsurgency campaign.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction/Background 
 
 1.1 Introduction/Background 
 
 The relatively recent rise of the private military industry is well documented in contemporary 
media and scholarship. Within the field there are many divisions, mainly to do with a number of key 
points, including: the causes of the growth of the industry, the contemporary web-like corporate nature 
of many private military companies (PMCs,) professional military's (and in particular the U.S. and UK) 
increased reliance on PMCs, problematic international law regarding mercenaries, PMCs and related 
entities, and issues of accountability and corruption.  
 
 A key issue within the scholarship on PMCs is their use in combat roles. Described by Singer as 
'tip of the spear'1 duties, an analogy typically applied to military units, these roles usually entail 
deployment within the 'tactical battlefield'2, as opposed to more traditional support roles, such as 
logistics or administration. 
 
 While scholars hold the general consensus that PMCs initially did not usually function in 
combat roles, this reality was overshadowed by a number of high profile cases involving mercenaries 
or PMCs engaged in, or planning to engage in combat, such as Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone or 
the attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea in 20043.  
 
 While many PMCs are still not engaged in combat roles as a primary function, scholars are now 
arguing that their combat roles are increasing, with roles varying but mainly consisting of: security 
provided to individuals; security provided to bases and facilities; security provided to logistical chains, 
and more covert roles, including participation in special forces and intelligence gathering operations.  
                                                
1 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 
91.  
2    Ibid, 91. 
 
3 See: Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006) and 
Eeben Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds. (South Africa: Galago Books, 2007). 
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 It has been argued that these combat roles are primarily defensive; the contractors defend a 
convoy of fuel-tankers, for example, when it is attacked or defends a guarded civilian from assassins. 
The use of deadly force may not, however, be measured, even when the responsibility is defensive. 
Contractors have been shown to be overly aggressive in discharging their responsibilities, with various 
instances of attacks on civilian populations within their areas of operations. The use of deadly force by 
PMCs may also be intentional, although concealed and denied. As indicated above, while there is 
ample scholarly research dedicated to rise of the PMC industry, this particular topic of combat roles is 
one less scrutinized to date. 
 
 1.2 Why the U.S in Afghanistan? 
 
 It is understood that the U.S. military and diplomatic arms are some of the largest employers of 
PMCs in the industry; this was the case well before the terror attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing military 
actions of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq.4 Afghanistan, however, has seen PMCs emerge to take on 
roles not previously seen before in their complexity and scope in a war zone.5 Particularly related to 
combat functions, Afghanistan has proved to be a highly challenging environment for PMCs, and one 
that warrants further scrutiny.6 While a similar analysis of PMC actions in Iraq would also be useful, 
time constraints will limit this study to a focus on Afghanistan.  
 
 1.3 Research Question  
 
 This thesis seeks to establish the relevant facts about PMCs combat roles, and does so in the 
context of the current counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. It focuses specifically on those 
                                                
4 David Isenberg, “Private Military Contractors and US Grand Strategy.”  PRIO Report 1/2009. www.prio.net. 
 
5  John F Tierney, "Warlord Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan." Report of the 
Majority Staff, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform. U.S. House of Representative, June 2010, accessed September 18, 2011, 
publicintelligence.info/WarlordInc.pdf. 
 
6  Ibid, Tierney, 1. This study highlights the high number of instances in which PMCs were forced to engage in combat, and 
will be analyzed in much greater detail later in this work.  
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PMCs employed by United States, specifically the Department of Defense (DOD), the State 
Department, the CIA and various aid agencies, mainly USAID. The question asked is thus of an 
empirical nature.  
 
 1.4 Methodology and Research Design 
  
 The research question is an empirical one, and thus answers will be of an empirical nature, 
meaning the resources gathered will need to generate the relevant material. It is also important to note 
that this is work is a form of atheoretical case study, meaning it is solely descriptive in nature, and 
focuses on a single country and conflict, Afghanistan7. Rather than attempt to form new theories 
regarding the topic, it aims to provide a baseline for further exploration while attempting to observe 
general trends present in the topic of PMCs operating in combat in Afghanistan. Although it has been 
pointed out that a true atheoretical case study likely does not exist8, this study’s aim and approach - in 
seeking to establish the facts around PMCs in combat - warrants its classification as a form of 
atheoretical case study.   
  
In order to obtain the necessary information for this work, the following will be examined: 
 
• Primary documents, mainly from various U.S. Congressional Committees and oversight bodies, 
the U.S. Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Inspector General and a number of others. 
 
• Reports from non-governmental organizations. 
 
• Documents from Private Military Companies themselves. 
 
• Secondary sources, which will include a range of materials from scholarly articles to the work 
on investigative journalists.  
 
                                                
7 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.” The American Political Science Review, Vol 65, No. 
3 (Sep.,1971), 691. 
 
8 Ibid, Lijphart. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
8 
 1.5 Limitations 
 
 This study will be limited to an analysis of the functions PMCs employed by the United States 
played in combat roles within the Afghanistan conflict from 2001 to 2010. The study of PMCs in their 
modern form is a difficult one, as it spans multiple disciplines, and this difficulty is reflected in the 
fragmented nature of modern literature on PMCs. My intention is not to come to definitive conclusions 
regarding the morality or legal implications of PMCs operating in Afghanistan, but rather gain an 
understanding of the roles they played in combat during the conflict. 
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 1.6 Acronyms 
 
ANA - Afghan National Army 
ANP - Afghan National Police 
AQ - al-Qaeda 
CENTCOM - U.S. Central Command 
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency 
COIN - Counterinsurgency 
CRS - U.S. Congressional Research Service 
DFAR - Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations 
DOD - Department of Defense 
EO - Executive Outcomes 
FAR - Federal Acquisitions Regulation 
FATA - Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FOB - Forward Operating Base 
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act 
GIRoA - Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
HNT - Host Nation Trucking 
IMU - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
ITAR - International Transfer of Arms Regulations 
KPD - Karzai Protective Detail 
MEJA - Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
NA - Northern Alliance 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO - Non-governmental Organization 
ODTC - Office of Defense Trade Controls 
OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom 
PMC - Private Military Company 
PMI - Private Military Industry 
PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team 
RFP - Request for Proposal 
RUF - Revolutionary United Front 
SF - Special Forces 
SOW - Statement of Work 
UCMJ - Uniformed Code of Military Justice  
WPPS - Worldwide Personal Protective Services 
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 1.7 Terminology 
 
 This section will briefly introduce some of the terminology used in this work, and provide 
clarity on what definitions will be used regarding various terms. Although there are multiple ways to 
identify the companies who employ contractors in Afghanistan to conduct security and combat related 
functions, for the sake of consistency this work will use the term PMC, for private military company. 
Other terms in common usage across various mediums include PMF (private military firm)9, PSC 
(private security company)10, while less common is PSP (private security provider) and MSP (military 
service provider). For many scholars – and for this dissertation - the term PMC denotes a highly 
focused private company, one that provides ‘tactical military services’11, or ‘military skills’12, who 
specialize in tasks such as intelligence gathering, support, training and combat operations, as opposed 
to more general functions.13   Some academics have distinguished between ‘PMC’ and the above 
classifications based on various factors, such as the services they provide14 or the contracts they sign15, 
although in broad, general usage the terms are interchangeable. Again, for consistencies sake, this work 
will stick to the term ‘PMC’, as opposed to utilizing multiple acronyms depending on a particular 
scholar’s interpretation of the function and actions of a particular company.  
  
 Combat is a term which also needs defining in the context of this work. For the purposes of this 
study, combat will refer to armed conflict or fighting between PMC personnel and adversarial forces in 
Afghanistan, which take a number of different forms. This can be engaging in actual warfighting, or the 
                                                
9 PMF is the acronym used to generally identify these entities in a number of academic works, most notably Singer, 
Corporate Warriors. 
 
10 PSC is the acronym generally used by U.S. Government organizations in their reports on Afghanistan. 
 
11    Ibid, Singer. 
 
12  Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini, "Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security 
Companies." Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 6, (March 2005): 2. 
 
13  Ibid, 2.  
 
14 Ibid, Singer.  
 
15 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Washington DC: George Washington 
University, 2005). 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
11 
command and control of assets on the battlefield, for example.16 Defining combat in relation to PMCs 
has proved difficult however, with various approaches often focusing on ‘direct’ versus ‘indirect’ 
combat for example, and how PMCs may or may not engage in each.17 What is clear is that extent to 
which PMCs are permitted to engage in combat, and how the government determines what constitutes 
combat is a controversial issue which resists clear definition, and will be covered in depth in further 
sections.  
  
 Lastly, the term COIN, which refers to counterinsurgency, will be used frequently in this work. 
COUIN is here defined as a strategy, utilizing multiple tactics, to confront an insurgency in one 
country.18 In the case of this paper, it will specifically refer to the overall effort by U.S. and ISAF 
forces against the Taliban, their foreign allies, and various other insurgent groups, following the 
conventional defeat of Taliban forces in the early stages of the war. This term will be further analyzed 
and covered extensively in Chapter Three. 
 
 1.8 Literature Review 
 
 This section will survey the existing literature relevant to the topic of PMCs in combat in 
Afghanistan. The review will aim to do a number of things, firstly to identify what is being written, by 
whom and in what way regarding PMC's in combat, and secondly, to highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses prevalent in the existing body of work. By focusing on these areas, it will become apparent 
that a wide ranging, holistic look at the topic of PMCs in combat in Afghanistan is currently lacking, as 
the current body of literature consists of very specific types of work.  
 
 The chapter will be broken down into various sections, which will discuss certain aspects of the 
literature on PMCs in combat in Afghanistan. Following this introduction the next sections will review 
the literature that has been produced by the four most common sources writing on the topic. These are: 
academics, the government/military, the NGO community, and investigative journalists. Although there 
                                                
16 Ibid, Singer. 
 
17 Ibid, Schreier & Caparini. 
 
18 David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Aug 2005) p 2. 
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are various sub-sections within each of these categories, these general classifications will provide the 
structure for the literature review.   
 
 Taken together, these four general areas provide the body of literature currently available 
covering the activities of and issues related to PMCs in combat in Afghanistan. A key characteristic of 
this body of literature as a whole is the disparate nature of its offerings. Each area tends of focus on 
either narrow, specific interests, or broad concepts covering the existence of PMCs themselves, as 
opposed to an overall look at their use in combat roles in Afghanistan. There are some common 
themes, however, the most prominent being the overall difficulty in obtaining information from 
Afghanistan, considering it is an active war-zone, among a number of other factors. The result of this is 
the focus in terms of PMCs tends to be on other themes, such as their corporatized nature, corruption, 
morality, etc, as opposed to the specific topic of combat. This paper will attempt to craft a more broad 
and holistic view of their use in combat, as existing offerings are by nature limited and tend to be 
highly focused. 
 
 1.8.1 Academics 
 
 From an academic standpoint, a rapid increase in authors publishing works on the private 
military industry has occurred since the late 1990's, in an attempt to keep pace with an ever expanding 
and often little understood topic.19  The most noteworthy, as well as most widely cited work is Peter 
Singers Corporate Soldiers20. Although not without its critics21, it is likely the most comprehensive 
analysis of the private military industry to date, and one which is sure to garner a mention in any 
academic work on the topic. That being said, precious little else exists in the way of robust academic 
discourse related to the specific issue of contractors in combat. Although the overall topic of the private 
military industry has seen a significant increase in focus, work on combat specifically is still relatively 
light. While a few other authors with a background in academia have published on the topic, such as 
                                                
19   Heather Gallup, "Blending the Battlefield: An Analysis of Using Private Military Companies to Support Military 
Operations in Iraq." (Masters diss., Air Force Institute of Technology, March 2008). 
 
20 Ibid, Singer. 
 
21 Richard Lacquement's review is noteworthy in this regard, see: Richard Lacquement, "Singer, Peter W. Corporate 
Warriors." Naval War College Review, Autumn 2004, accessed May 18, 2011, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_57/ai_n8685846/. 
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Deborah Avant22 the overall body of academic literature on the topic is relatively sparse. 
 
 Within the overall body of work on the private military industry, a few key themes do emerge. 
They mainly deal with perceived 'problems' related to the industry. These are morality, accountability, 
legality and increasing corporate structure of PMCs. Most academic work on the topic of PMCs will 
focus at least in part on one or all of these four issues.  Although Singer would be the most ubiquitous, 
other authorities on the subject currently include the aforementioned Deborah Avant, as well as Sarah 
Percy and a number of others. 
 
 Related to combat and specific instances of combat in Afghanistan, academic work is even less 
prevalent. Afghanistan being an active war zone, it is very difficult for academics to gain access to the 
sources and material necessary for a robust study of the topic. Combined with the secrecy currently 
inherent in the private military industry and their relationship with state actors, it is likely some time 
before more regular and in depth academic work emerges on the topic of PMCs in combat in 
Afghanistan. One instance of combat, however, has been addressed, and that is the case of Executive 
Outcomes in Sierra Leone. Hired by the embattled Sierr  Leone government in 1994 to arrest the 
advance and push back the rebel RUF from the capital, Freetown, the South African based company 
produced spectacular results. Highly trained as well as tactically and technologically superior to their 
opponents, EO pushed the RUF away from Freetown and deep into the Sierra Leone hinterland, before 
being forced out of the country by pressure from the United Nations and African Union.  
 
 As one would expect, a number of the key issues related to EO are addressed by scholars, these 
being morality, legality, accountability and the corporatized nature of the company. The tone of such 
works varies widely however. Some point out that while serious questions related to the legality and 
accountability of Executive Outcomes remains, the fact is that the company provided an effective, 
viable alternative for a government with little other option.23 Others decried Executive Outcomes as 
simply a new form of neocolonialism, further exacerbating conflict as opposed to resolving it due to the 
                                                
22 See Avant, The Market for Force. 
 
23 Herbert Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes.", The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol 36, No 2 (June 1998): 330-331. 
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temporary nature of their presence in Sierra Leone.24 The case of Executive Outcomes is the most oft-
cited instance of PMCs in combat among scholars, and various methods and conclusions in analysis 
can be found in works by Singer and Avant, as well as a number of other scholars, including Howe25, 
Francis26, Cilliers27, and Cleary (although he focuses on their activities in Angola)28 among others. 
 
 Although limited in its current form, it is a certainty that the amount of research conducted by 
academics on the use of PMCs in combat will increase in the near future. Although the existing body of 
work is relatively limited, and generally focused on a select few high profile examples, as the Afghan 
war eventually winds down information will become more available to scholars. Analyzing what is 
currently available, one can identify the primary issues concerning scholars, mainly the morality, 
accountability, legality and corporatized makeup of PMCs. 
 1.8.2 Government/Military 
 
 The U.S. Government and military are perhaps the most important and insightful source of 
information regarding PMCs in combat in Afghanistan. Much of this work avoids explicit discussion of 
combat per say, due to the fact that it is illegal for private contractors to engage in combat activities.  
For example, the U.S. Congressional Research Service regularly publishes reports on the use of 
contractors by U.S. forces in Afghanistan29 in which the author will often discuss the roles armed 
contractors undertake and their overall numbers in country, but won't specifically discuss instances of 
combat.30 Other reports from both CRS31 and the Department of Labor32 will also even provide detail on 
                                                
24 David Francis, "Mercenary intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?" 
Third World Quarterly, Vol 20 No 2 (1999): 335-336. 
 
25 Ibid, Howe. 
 
26 Ibid, Francis. 
 
27 Jackie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, Peace, Profit or Plunder?: The Privatisation of Security  in War-Torn African 
Societies. (South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999). Book available for download at 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/BlurbPPP.HTML. 
 
28 Sean Cleary, "Angola - A case study of private military involvement." in Peace, Profit or Plunder? 
 
29 Moshe Schwartz, "The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress." U.S. Congressional Research Service, January 19, 2010, accessed 
May 1, 2011, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40835.pdf  
 
30 Ibid, Schwartz. 
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the deaths of armed contractors in Afghanistan (as well as unarmed), but again, may not discuss 
whether or not these deaths occurred while engaging in combat. That being said, a number of reports 
by various organizations have delved into the issue of PMCs engaging in combat. 
 
 Perhaps the two most crucial source of governmental reporting on PMCs are Congressional 
Committees and oversight bodies. Committees such as the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Security, Senate Armed Services Committee, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and the House Committee on 
Armed Services, among others, provide a detailed and wide ranging source of information on PMCs in 
Afghanistan. Their reports cover issues ranging from corruption during the tender and bidding 
process33 to a potential over-reliance on the services of PMCs34, with much in between, including 
PMCs undertaking combat functions.  
 
 The second, oversight bodies, also constitute an important source of first hand information. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Government Accountability Office (GAO), State Department 
Office of the Inspector General and others all provide reporting on the topic of the use of PMCs in 
Afghanistan. These reports naturally tend to focus on accountability issues, such as whether contractors 
and those hiring them are correctly following all procedures and laws relevant to them.35 These two 
governmental sources will provide much key information for this report, as they have wider ranging 
and better access to information than other mediums, as well as being more reliable in general. 
 
 In addition to reports generated from Congress and oversight bodies, an additional 
                                                                                                                                                                 
31 Valerie Bailey Grasso, Baird Webel and Scott Szymendera. "The Defense Base Act (DBA): The Federally  Mandated 
Workers’ Compensation System for  Overseas Government Contractors." U.S. Congressional Research Service, April 9, 
2010, accessed May 4, 2011, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34670.pdf. 
 
32 Department of Labor figures are available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallemployer.htm. 
 
33  U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Contingency Contracting: Implementing a Call for Urgent 
       Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 9, 2008. 
 
34  U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, An Uneasy Relationship: U.S. 
       Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2008. 
 
35  John P. Hutton, "Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan." GAO Report to Congressional Committees. U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2008, 
accessed May 12, 2011, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0919.pdf. 
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governmental source which has proliferated rapidly is that of military research. This source tends to be 
bespoke research reports, or dissertations generated from the postgraduate institutes run by the three 
branches of the U.S. military, and similar institutions of various other military's, including the UK and 
Australia. The authors of these reports, officers in their respective military's, could generally be 
categorized as falling into two camps, those who are wary of the rapid rise of PMCs and their 
encroachment on areas traditionally reserved for uniformed military personnel, notably combat, and 
those who see this trend as inevitable, and welcome the assistance of the private sector to an already 
stretched thin military.36 Serving military officers can provide a number of unique insights in their 
research which would not be found in work by academics or journalists. Their detailed knowledge of 
things such as counterinsurgency (COIN) and military & intelligence gathering tactics can provide a 
more holistic understanding of the overall topic of PMCs, and specifically their use in combat.37 
 
 1.8.3 NGOs/Think Tanks  
 
 The NGO community provides a diverse and often unique insight into the topic of PMCs in 
combat in Afghanistan. This is mainly due to the fact that NGOs are often highly focused on one 
specific theme, for example de-mining, human rights, or combating small arms proliferation. These can 
take the form of advocacy groups, such as Human Rights Watch or CorpWatch, who focus on a 
specific topic area or represent a certain industry, NGOs who work extensively on the ground in 
Afghanistan, such as various UN bodies, and finally independent research units, such as SwissPeace. 
Those NGOs which work specifically in a sector which would be impacted by PMC activities or 
security in general, have therefore produced a number of valuable reports from Afghanistan. Due to 
their highly detailed knowledge of their area of interest and their presence on the ground in 
Afghanistan, their reports tend to provide a level of detail not often found in other mediums. Inevitably, 
reports from NGOs also adopt the tone of their authors, meaning that many such reports cast 
contractors in a seemingly negative light, highlighting things such as crimes against civilians38, or 
                                                
36 Ibid, Schreier & Caparini, 30. 
 
37 Brent Jorgensen, "Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military 
Operations." (Masters Diss., USNPS, September 2005).  
 
38 Ulrike Joras and Adrian Schuster, "Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An Exploratory Study of 
Afghanistan and Angola." Working Paper, SwissPeace, April 2008. 
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corruption39.  
  
 Think Tanks also provide material related to PMC activities in Afghanistan. Groups such as the 
RAND Corporation, the International Institute for Security Studies, the International Crisis Group and 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) all have completed in depth studies on 
various topics related to PMC activities in Afghanistan. As think tanks aim to provide research which 
can guide and influence public policy, their reports often focus on PMCs and their activities in combat 
in part, if at all, and not as a focus of their research. As they often have a certain issue-specific focus, or 
even ideological base, the tone and content of their reports can vary widely. That being said, they do 
provide valuable information on a number of topics related to PMCs in Afghanistan.  
 
 1.8.4 Investigative Journalists 
 
 By far the most available and wide ranging array of literature on PMCs in U.S. combat in 
Afghanistan comes from investigative journalists. This form of literature is an excellent example of 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the overall body of work on PMCs in combat. Many journalists, 
mostly American, are able to use their investigative abilities to break stories which likely would not 
have made it into the public view without their persistence and contacts within both the military and 
private military industry.  
 
 There are a number of high profile instances of journalists breaking major stories on the use of 
PMCs in combat operations. Mark Mazzetti40 and his colleagues at the New York Times have broken 
numerous stories, including that of Blackwater allegedly being intricately involved in a covert CIA 
assassination program41, as well as being involved in the expanding drone war in Afghanistan and the 
Pakistani tribal regions.42 Other stories reported by the Times and Mazzetti and his colleagues include 
                                                
39 Fariba Nawa, "Afghanistan Inc." CorpWatch Investigative Report. October 6, 2006, accessed May 8, 2011, 
http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=13518. 
 
40 For a full list of articles see: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/mark_mazzetti/index.html. 
 
41 Mark Mazzetti, "C.I.A. Sought Blackwater's Help to Kill Jihadists." New York Times, August 19, 2009, accessed 
February 8, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/us/20intel.html. 
 
42 Mark Mazzetti and James Risen, "CIA Said to Use Outsiders to Put Bombs on Drones." New York Times, August 20, 
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the revelation that the Department of Defense was using a network of private contractors to track and 
kill militants43, and the FBI employed a similar network to hunt militants linked to the murder of aid 
workers in 2010.44 The Washington Post is another major U.S. daily which has contributed prolifically 
to the topic of PMCs in combat in Afghanistan, most notably its two year long investigation by Dana 
Priest and William Arkin titled 'Top Secret America', which attempted to portray the enormous scope 
and complexity of the private security and intelligence industry which has emerged since 9/11.45 Karen 
DeYoung has also been a frequent contributor to the topic for the Washington Post.46 Also following 
the topic closely are the LA Times, the Christian Science Monitor, Pajhwok Afghan News, and others. 
  
 Magazines, such as Salon, Vanity Fair, The Nation and Wired, among others, have also 
contributed numerous in-depth reports on PMCs in combat. Authors such as JeremyScahill47, David 
Axe48, David Isenberg49, Spencer Ackerman50 and others all have contributed a number of stories. 
Various books written in a similar style have also been published. Robert Young Pelton's Licensed to 
Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror would be the most notable, where he recounts various stories of 
private contractors involved in covert operations in Afghanistan, including the story of the infamous 
Jack Idema.51   
 
 While these types of reports provide value in that they bring to light actions and events which 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2009, accessed February 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/us/21intel.html. 
43 Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, "Contractors Tied to Effort to Track and Kill Militants." New York Times, March 14, 
2010, accessed March 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/15/world/asia/15contractors.html?ref=global-home.  
 
44 Mark Mazzetti, "Private Spies Aid FBI in Afghan Investigation." New York Times, February 28, 2011, accessed May 15, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/asia/01clarridge.html?_r=1&ref=global-home.  
 
45 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, "Top Secret America, A Washington Post Investigation." The Washington Post. July 
19, 2010, accessed September 3, 2011, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/. 
 
46 See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/karen-deyoung/2011/03/02/AB56xmP_viewAll.html. 
 
47 For an extensive list of these types of reports see: http://www.thenation.com/authors/jeremy-scahill.  
 
48 David Axe's work can be found on his own personal website, see: www.warisboring.com/category/david-axe. 
 
49 David Isenberg's work for the Huffington Post can be found at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg. He also 
blogs at http://isenberg.securitycontracting.net/. 
 
50 Spencer Ackerman's work can be found at: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/. 
 
51 Ibid, Pelton, 227-251. 
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may have otherwise gone unreported, they also highlight one the main weaknesses of the literature on 
PMCs in U.S. combat in Afghanistan. This is that although a number of excellent investigative pieces 
have been written, the reality is that the majority of media coverage on PMCs in combat in Afghanistan 
tends to be melodramatic, and designed to convey a certain emotion to the reader. It is not difficult to 
conjure up images of mercenaries of yesteryear in descriptions of secretive contractors hunting 
militants in the mountains of Afghanistan, coming from unnamed and unverifiable sources. This 
'soldier of fortune' style of descriptive language pervades many of these types of reports, and inevitably 
leaves the focus on the controversy surrounding the topic itself, as opposed to taking a measured, 
insightful look at the issues involved.52  
 
 1.8.5 Conclusions 
 
 It is important to emphasize a number of key points in regards to the exiting literature on the 
topic; mainly that Afghanistan is still an active war-zone, and thus it remains extremely challenging to 
conduct research and obtain consistent, accurate and unbiased information. The result is that while 
multiple articles, reports and books have been published on the topic of PMCs in Afghanistan, the 
reality is that combat is generally merely a part of reporting, as opposed to the focus.  As a result, the 
existing literature specifically dealing with combat is widely varied in terms of its topics, and generally 
focused on specific incidents, companies or individuals. In addition to this, certain types of writing can 
convey emotions, generally negative, which can manipulate the reader’s interpretation of the story, thus 
distorting analysis. While this generally affects more journalistic style accounts, it is important to note 
that this medium is also able to obtain and report types of information not available in others, and can 
expose previously unknown topics. 
 
 A further point of emphasis is that the most common source of information specifically 
regarding PMCs in combat comes from the governmental sector, and specifically U.S. Congressional 
committees, as well as oversight bodies. Reports and information from these two groups will be the 
primary sources of analysis for this work. Summarizing the various sources of information above, a 
clear characteristic is the disparate nature of the sources, in terms of their authors and content. While 
various works cover highly specific incidents regarding PMCs in combat, or more broad themes 
                                                
52 Ibid, Schreier and Caparini, 10-11. 
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regarding contractors overall, there are few descriptive works on the topic of PMCs in combat in 
Afghanistan. This work will attempt to use the various above named sources to provide a more 
complete framework and understanding regarding PMCs in combat in Afghanistan.  
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Chapter 2 - The U.S. Use of Contractors in Combat: Select Themes 
 
 This chapter introduces the use of contractors in combat situations by the United States 
government, encompassing both the Pentagon and other agencies. The purpose of the chapter is to 
highlight a number of specific themes. The first is that the use of private contractors by the U.S. 
government has increased rapidly since the end of the Cold War, for a number of readily identifiable 
reasons. The second theme is that while the roles of contractors within the overall increase have 
diversified widely, they still mainly conduct support functions, and generally do not engage in combat. 
So while it will be shown that at times support functions can rapidly evolve into combat situations 
given certain sets of circumstances, combat is very much the exception and not the rule when it comes 
to U.S. government contractors. A further theme is related to the laws governing both private 
companies who obtain government contracts, as well as the individuals who are employed by the 
companies. While laws and regulations do exist, they have yet to catch up with the realities involved in 
the contracting process, leaving much room for potential fraud, corruption and a general lack of clarity 
related to the existence and operations of many companies and their employees. Specific sections will 
look at both the laws relating to contracting companies and their employees, as well as the major issues 
with those laws in their current state. By analyzing these issues, this chapter aims to identify the key 
themes related to contractors on the battlefield, and develop the framework through which to examine 
the case of the Afghanistan War, and U.S. contracting during the conflict.  
 
 2.1 Contractors and the U.S. Military 
 
 This section provides a brief historical background on contractors as used by the U.S. Military 
and other governmental organizations. This will be done through an introduction to the reasons why 
such a large scale proliferation of PMCs occurred following the end of the Cold War, and a brief look 
at the evolution of roles undertaken by PMCs from then until now. As PMCs roles expanded, in some 
cases the lines were blurred between support and combat functions, requiring them to engage in 
combat. A number of examples of this will be analyzed, with the aim to show that while combat is not 
the norm for most PMCs, their ever expanding roles often force them into situations which require 
combat. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
22 
 
 2.1.1 The Rise of the Private Military Industry 
 
 Much scholarship has focused on the increase in the use of contractors within the sphere of U.S. 
military operations in the latter stages of the 20th century. This section will introduce the specific 
reasons for this increase following the end of the Cold War. It can mainly be attributed to the general 
downsizing of standing armies globally (the U.S. Military in particular), a reluctance on the behalf of 
U.S. Presidents to engage in low intensity conflicts common during the Cold War, the increased 
technological sophistication of weapons systems, and the general trend towards privatization across all 
sectors, not only military services.  
 
 Primary among the reasons for the initial surge in privatized military functions was the fall of 
the Soviet Union, which led to subsequent downsizing of the U.S. military.53  No longer faced with a 
global power in an adversarial position, the U.S. Military no longer required the sheer number of troops 
it had kept on active duty to this point. It is estimated that over 7 million soldiers around the world 
were cast into the civilian world54; while the U.S. military found itself at the end of the 1990's with 
285,000 fewer active duty soldiers than it had in 1990.55 Naturally, a massive decrease in manpower 
led to gaps which would need to be filled.  
 
 Ancillary to this was the reluctance on the part of the U.S. government to officially engage in 
further low intensity conflicts which had characterized the 1970's and 80's. Although numbers wise, the 
actual instances of U.S. troop deployments increased in the 1990's, the aforementioned manpower 
strain and increased wariness of domestic public opinion necessitated the more widespread use of 
contractors.56 Rather than use U.S. Special Forces in their traditional role of training indigenous troops 
                                                
53 For more details on the overall downsizing of the U.S. Military and how it related to the proliferation of PMCs, see 
Singer, Corporate Warriors. 
 
54 Ibid, Schrier and Caparini, 3. 
 
55  Bart Brasher, Implosion: Downsizing the U.S. Military, 1987-2015 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 213, taken from  
Michael Kornburger and Jeremy Dobos, "Private Military Companies: Analyzing the Use of Armed Contractors" 
(Masters diss, USNPS, 2007). 
 
56 Ibid, Schreier and Caparini, 4. Here they point out that from 1990-2000 the U.S. Army was deployed 36 times. In the 40 
year Cold War, they were only deployed 10.  
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and police, in addition to other functions, in many instances in the 1990's and 2000's the Pentagon 
turned to private contractors to fulfill this duty. A number of these examples will be detailed later on in 
this section. Although private firms had been used for this specific function since the 1970's, the 
practice expanded greatly following the downsizing of U.S. forces. Today it is estimated that U.S. 
PMCs provide training services to military's and police forces in over 40 countries.57 
 
 A further cause of the increased use of PMCs was the widespread adoption of more 
sophisticated weapons and communications systems by the U.S. Military. With this increase in 
sophistication comes an accompanying increase in reliance on civilians, often those who built the 
system in the first place, in order to service, train in the use of, and in some cases, even operate 
hardware and software used by the U.S. military.58 In the high profile case of Predator drones, which 
are used to target individual enemy combatants, it was widely reported in 2009 that a private firm was 
contracted by the U.S. Government (in this case, the CIA), to maintain, as well as assemble and load 
munitions onto Predator drones which were then sent on missions.59 In this case the CIA deemed it 
required the expertise of a PMC in order to effectively carry out its missions using the drones. General 
Michael Hayden, who headed the CIA from 2006 to 2009, stated "There are skills we don't have in 
government that we may have an immediate requirement for."60 Examples such as these are widespread 
in the current day U.S. military.  
 
 The final theme discussed in this section relates to what Singer identifies as the 'privatization 
revolution'61, or Schreier and Caparini call 'the ultimate representation of neo-liberalism'62; namely the 
idea that domains which were previously associated with the public sector alone have now been opened 
up and made available to the private sector. Many functions previously reserved for the military 
exclusively have begun to move to the private sector, and this is a trend which spreads across a number 
                                                
57 Esther Schrader. "U.S. Companies Hired to Train Foreign Armies." Los Angeles Times, April 14, 2002, accessed April 
12, 2011, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/training/pmc.htm. 
 
58 Ibid, Singer, 62. 
 
59   Ibid, Risen and Mazzetti, "CIA Said to Use Outsiders to Put Bombs on Drones."  
 
60 Ibid, Risen and Mazzetti.  
 
61 Ibid, Singer, 49. 
 
62 Ibid, Schreier and Caparini,  5. 
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of sectors. In the United States, everything from sanitation to the administration of public libraries has 
moved into the private sphere in recent years, eliciting mixed reactions from government and citizens.63 
This overall trend has certainly manifested itself in the military and intelligence realms, with massive 
increases in contracting since the early 1990's.  
 
 As demonstrated, a confluence of circumstances and varying factors has lead to the increased 
privatization of military functions. Although a number of other reasons also have played a key role in 
developing the situation into what it is today, the primary causes have been identified above. The above 
factors not only have played a key role in the overall increase of contracting out functions, but also in 
the nature and type of roles contracted out to PMCs.  
 
 2.1.2 A Variety of Roles 
  
 This section will briefly introduce the concept of greatly xpanded roles for contractors as time 
progressed from the 1990's into the 2000's, and saw U.S. troop deployment across two major theaters. 
Although contractors were used by the U.S. Military and intelligence arms previously, the type and 
variety of roles expanded drastically from their standard functions of training and logistical support.  
 
 As the end of the Cold War transitioned into the mid and late 1990's, a large number of 
functions previously performed by uniformed U.S. soldiers were outsourced to private firms. In the 
period from 1994-2002, the Department of Defense entered into over 3,000 contracts with U.S. based 
PMCs, who provided a variety of services.64 As time progressed however, the type of roles contractors 
were paid to perform began to vary widely. As indicated, the U.S. outsourced mostly training functions 
to private contractors, generally to train foreign military's (so as to not stretch to thin the Military's 
Special Forces capability), or provide logistical support to deployed U.S. troops. As a number of the 
factors mentioned in the previous section converged however, specifically force downsizing and the 
increased sophistication of weaponry, these roles began to expand. No longer bound to their traditional 
                                                
63 David Streitfeld, "Anger as Private Company Takes Over Libraries." New York Times. September 26, 2010, accessed 
April 2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/business/27libraries.html. 
 
64 P.W. Singer, "War, Profits and Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law." Columbia Journal of  
Transnational Law, 42, (2004): 522. 
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roles as cooks, cleaners, trainers, drivers and others, contractors can now be found operating as 
"communication specialists, intelligence operatives, target selectors, surveillance pilots, armed security 
and peacekeeping agents, hostage rescuers, interrogators and weapons system operators."65  
 
 After Operation Desert Storm was initiated in 1990, various contractors sprung into action in 
order to support the deployment of U.S. troops. The U.S. military awarded contracts to 76 companies, 
who employed nearly 10,000 people in order to support U.S. troops.66 Their roles included water and 
petroleum supply, maintenance, laundry, engineering and cargo haul services.67 Although their use was 
fairly extensive, their roles generally did not extend out of the traditional support functions.  
 
 Fast forward to the early 2000's and the U.S. Military deployment in Southwest Asia, and it is 
clear that contractors roles have expanded noticeably from the previous U.S. troop deployment to the 
area. For example, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office notes that under the provisions of the 
LOGCAP III (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program), which in theory deals with logistical issues 
only, contractors provided many of the same services as previously rendered during Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield, but now also included: ammunition storage and supply, hazardous-materials 
management, communications and information technology, firefighting services, morale, welfare and 
recreation services, and a number of others which were not explicitly part of previous deployments.68 
While these functions are still decidedly support based in nature, a gradual increase in the roles taken 
on by contractors was apparent at this stage.  
 
 In the Afghanistan War, from 2001 to 2010, contractors took on all the aforementioned roles 
and more. These will be discussed in subsequent chapters, although it can be pointed out that 
contractors have played a crucial role in the conflict on behalf of the U.S. Military, both in the standard 
support roles, as well as a wide array of roles not previously seen undertaken by a contractor.  
 
                                                
65 Jon D. Michaels, "Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic and Strategic Problems with Privatizing 
War.", Washington University Law Quarterly, Volume 82 (2004): 1019. 
 
66 Congressional Budget Office. "Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces." Congressional Budget Office Study, 
October 2005, accessed April 23, 2011, www.cbo.gov. 
 
67 Ibid, CBO, 4.  
 
68 Ibid, CBO, 8. 
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 2.1.3  From Support to Combat 
 
 All the roles which contractors undertake on behalf of the U.S. Government in a war zone 
mentioned in previous sections are very much support based. Logistics, cleaning, even training were 
very clearly separated from the act of engaging in combat with adversarial forces. However, the 
modern battlefield is not the clear cut arena it once was, where trenches and lines of infantry 
demarcated the territory held by opposing sides. In the modern, fluid combat environment, contractors 
in support functions can rapidly find themselves forced to engage in combat, due to a variety of 
circumstances. This section will highlight a number of examples where contractors employed by the 
U.S. government to complete a support role ended up engaging in a task far closer to combat than 
initially envisioned.  A number of these cases are reviewed below. 
 
 The role of private actors in the 'war on drugs' in Latin America is certainly extensive, but very 
little information, comparative to other conflicts, is available in the public sphere. Although 
conventional U.S. military units were and are not engaged specifically in 'combat' against the FARC or 
other groups involved in drug trafficking in Colombia, private companies such as DynCorp have 
engaged in various activities targeting them.69 These include gathering intelligence for Colombian 
police and military actions, as well as aerial defoliation using chemicals.70 These actions have also 
brought casualties and capture, including the deaths of three pilots employed by Eagle Aviation Service 
and Technology Inc. (EAST), a DynCorp subsidiary, while flying over Colombia, and in 2003 when a 
number of employees of California Microwave Systems, a Northrop Grumman subsidiary, where 
captured by FARC forces while conducting intelligence gathering and rescue operations.71 So while 
ostensibly in Colombia to strictly provide support services, employees of these firms often found 
themselves on the front lines, taking fire from FARC and other forces, and sustaining casualties. 
 
 Another example of private contractors taking on more combat related roles is that of the 
                                                
69 Josh Hammer and Michael Isikoff, "A Mysterious Plane Crash Highlights U.S. Covert Operations.", Newsweek, August 
9, 1999, accessed April 10, 2011, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v99.n812.a08.html. 
 
70 Ibid, Hammer and Isikoff. 
 
71 Juan Forero, "3 Americans on Search Mission Killed in Colombian Plane Crash.", New York Times, March 27, 2003, 
accessed April 10, 2011, 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30F10FF3A540C748EDDAA0894DB404482.   
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Balkans conflicts of the mid and late 1990's. Due mainly to various political factors influencing the 
decision making of the U.S. Presidency, overt U.S. Military assistance of both Croatian and Bosnian 
forces in opposition to Serbia was not possible. Still committed to assisting them against expansionist 
behavior on the part of Serbian forces, the Clinton administration authorized private companies, and in 
particular MPRI and its subsidiaries, to assist the Bosnians and Croats in various ways.  
 
 While MPRI assisted Croatian military forces primarily in a training capacity, the results were 
almost instantaneous, with a force considered 'poor quality'72 by the Pentagon prior to the introduction 
of MPRI, conducting an advanced tactical offensive in 1995, routing Serbian forces in opposition and 
forcing over 100,000 Serbian civilians from their homes.73 According to those familiar with the 
operation, "the Croat forces used typical American combined-arms tactics, including integrated air, 
artillery and infantry movements, as well as maneuver warfare targeted against Serbian command, 
control and communication systems."74 Having in their ranks a number of American ex-military 
officers who had direct experience implementing such tactics against Saddam Hussein's forces in 
Desert Storm 4 years earlier, it is clear that MPRI was able to have an immediate impact on the 
conflict.75 Although this was a highly successful operation, MPRI did not go without criticism, being 
accused of having actually directed the offensive76, as well as simply providing a convenient way for 
Washington D.C. to implement policy by proxy, without the risk of committing troops to combat.77 
 
 Two other little reported example of private contractors engaging in combat occurred in Saudi 
Arabia in 1991 and Rwanda in 1994. The Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman, 
began training the Saudi National Guard, on behalf of the U.S. Government in 1975.78 In 1991, when 
                                                
72 Leslie Wayne, "America's For-Profit Secret Army." New York Times, October 13, 2002, accessed April 11, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/business/america-s-for-profit-secret-army.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.  
 
73 Ibid, Wayne. 
 
74 Thomas K. Adams, "The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict." Parameters, (Summer 1999): 109.  
 
75 Ibid, Wayne. 
 
76 Ibid, Adams, 109. 
 
77 Eugene B. Smith, "The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The Privatization of Conflict and its Implications." 
Parameters, (Winter 2002-2003): 110-111. 
 
78 Global Security. "Saudi Arabian National Guard." globalsecurity.org, accessed April 12, 2011, 
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Iraqi forces invaded the Saudi town of Khafji, Vinnell employees allegedly joined the Saudi National 
Guard units they had been training in engaging the Iraqis in combat.79 Although there ostensibly to 
provide training only, the unique circumstances of the invasion prompted employees of Vinnell to 
participate in its repulsion. Although the company will deny direct involvement to this day, a number 
of employees of the company and other firms employed in the area confirm the story.80 
 
 In Rwanda in 1994, the firm Ronco, now part of Group 4 Securicor, found itself in the midst of 
the Hutu extremist genocide of Rwanda's Tutsi and moderate Hutu inhabitants.81 Under contract to the 
Department of Defense, Ronco was tasked with undertaking de-mining training activities in the country 
when the genocide began. Finding itself in a dynamic and rapidly changing environment, the 
contractors expanded from their primary activity of de-mining into further training roles, including that 
of training the newly formed Rwandan Patriotic Army, as well as the police services.82 It is also alleged 
that during the genocide they protected various villages from attack.83 
 
 These examples show that while the U.S. Government employs contractors primarily in support 
roles, various factors can quickly lead them to engage in 'combat'. This phenomenon is one that can be 
expected in the context of the modern battlefield, where rapidly changing and fluid circumstances can 
quickly lead to civilian involvement in combat. Examples such as these will also be seen in the case of 
Afghanistan, highlighted in further chapters.  
 
 It is clear that contractors have become an integral part of U.S. military operations, so much so 
that it would likely be impossible for the armed forces to conduct overseas operations without their 
presence. This was not always the case however, with the proliferation of PMCs occurring rapidly 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/sang.htm. 
 
79 Esther Schrader. "U.S. Companies Hired to Train Foreign Armies." Los Angeles Times, April 14, 2002, accessed April 
12, 2011, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/training/pmc.htm. 
 
80 Ibid, Schrader. 
 
81 Ibid, Michaels, 1036. 
 
82 Susan Buchner. The Role of Mercenaries in Contemporary International Relations. (University of Johannesburg 
Department of Political Studies, 2008), 127, accessed April 10, 2011, http://hdl.handle.net/10210/370. 
 
83 Ibid, Michaels, 1034. 
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following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's. There are a number of factors which 
influenced this rise, leading to today's current state where PMCs undertake more numerous and a wider 
variety of tasks than ever before. It had also been seen that while often in crucial supporting roles, 
contractors can rapidly be thrust into combat situations, due to the ever shifting nature of the modern 
battlefield. The next section will analyze the legal background related to contractors; in terms of both 
the companies themselves, and the individuals employed by them 
 
 2.2 U.S. Policies on the Use of Contractors - Legal Background 
 
 Today's PMCs are a far cry from the mercenaries of yesteryear, as increased government use 
has brought further legitimacy, and forced companies to adopt advanced corporate structures, at times 
indistinguishable from companies in other private sectors. Unlike other sectors however, the law 
governing both PMCs and the individuals employed by them has yet to keep pace with the rapid 
proliferation of the companies themselves and the ever more complex roles they have acquired from 
the U.S. Government. This section will analyze the law relating to PMCs in a number of parts. Initially 
the laws regarding companies will be introduced, followed by the laws related to individuals employed 
by PMCs. Following this, some of the current weaknesses of this system will be highlighted, 
specifically the idea that the laws in their current form leave ample space for various forms of 
corruption and fraud, in the pursuit of increasingly lucrative private contracts.  
 
 2.2.1  The Law about Private Military Companies 
 
 This section briefly introduces the various laws and regulations which govern the use of PMCs 
by the U.S. Government. The constitutional basis for use of PMCs is quite clear, and further laws have 
been developed in an attempt to guide and govern the industry. The success these laws have had in 
ensuring a fair and accountable contracting process is debatable however. This section will only focus 
on the laws as they exist currently, further issues will be examined later. What is clear is that while 
current laws and regulations lend legitimacy to the existence and use of PMCs, in their current form 
they are not sufficient to prevent corruption and fraud by the companies and individuals who work for 
them.  
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 Legally, the right for PMCs to exist and operate is enshrined in Article I Section 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which ensures that the defense of the United States is not the sole reserve of the 
government itself.84 Although this particular passage intended to deal with such things as rebellions or 
insurrections within the country, it does clearly indicate that the existence of a private military industry 
is a part of the defense of the United States. The industry has not been established without opposition 
however. A key issue framed within the overall debate of the government vs private sector is what - 
exactly - is an 'inherently governmental function', as this will determine whether or not the private 
sector can be used to perform that function.85 
 
 The U.S. government defines an inherently governmental function as "a function so intimately 
related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees."86 The 
OMB Circular A-76 also provides a similar definition to guide policy makers.87 Generally, functions 
are broken down into three broad categories, those that must be performed by a federal employee, those 
that should and those which can be transferred to the private sector.88 Naturally, debate over which 
functions fall within these separate categories is common, especially so in regards to PMCs and their 
operations. As the global strategic landscape changed drastically following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990's, the rapid emergence of the private military industry fueled the debate even 
further, as PMCs took on more and increasingly diverse roles.  
 
 In terms of national regulation of the industry, PMCs generally avoid much of the legislation 
aimed at mercenarism, while no legislation exists which prohibits the sale of 'military services'.89 Thus 
                                                
84 Available at www.usconstitution.net. 
 
85 John R Luckey, Valerie Bailey Grasso, Kate M Manuel, "Inherently Governmental Functions and Department of 
Defense Operations: Background, Issues and Options for Congress." U.S. Congressional Research Service. June 22, 
2009, accessed April 11, 2011, 1-6. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40641.pdf. 
 
86 Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act - 1998, full act is available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_fairact/. 
 
87 OMB Circular A-76, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a076_a76_incl_tech_correction.  
 
88 Ibid, Luckey, Grasso and Manuel, 1-6. 
 
89 Ibid, Singer, 537. 
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PMCs are free to offer a wide range of services to military clients. PMCs cannot provide these services 
however without first registering and licensing themselves with the State Department (Office of 
Defense Trade Controls), through the provisions of the International Transfer of Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) controls.90 ITAR was formed in the wake of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act of 1968, but 
evolved to incorporate PMCs as well.91 The ODTC will analyze the company and decide whether or 
not to grant a license for it to operate. Further checks exist in relation to the size of the contract a 
company is bidding on. In theory, a congressional review is triggered when a contract reaches $50 
million or more in size. In practice the sheer volume of contracts reaching this size makes such 
oversight difficult. 
 
 Further mechanisms governing and regulating the use of contractors are the FAR (Federal 
Acquisitions Regulations) and the DFAR (Defense Federal Acquisitions Regulations). The FAR 
intends to "deliver on a timely basis the best value product or service to the customer, while 
maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy objectives,"92 as well as "using contractors 
who have a track record of successful past performance or who demonstrate a current superior ability to 
perform,"93. Although it attempts to put in further steps in the regulatory chain to ensure the best value 
for the customer, it will be seen later that there is much overlap, and room for potential fraud.  
 
 2.2.2 The Contracting Process 
 
 PMCs obtain contracts from the Federal Government via a process formalized by the FAR.94 
Under the Regulation, a government agency will determine that it has a need that it cannot fulfill with 
existing personnel, or that this need can be better filled by an outside company.95 The agency then 
                                                
90 Kathleen M Jennings, "Armed Services: Regulating the Private Military Industry." New Security Programme, FAFO. 
(2006): 31-32. 
 
91 Ibid, Jennings, 32. 
 
92 FAR Regulation. Available at https://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%201_1.html#wp1130776. 
 
93 Ibid, FAR. 
 
94 Documents detailing process available at https://www.acquisition.gov/far/. 
 
95 The majority of this section is taken from Jorgensen, "Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military 
Companies in U.S. Military Operations". 
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crafts a Request for Proposal (RFP) and a Statement of Work (SOW), which details exactly what work 
needs to be done by the outside contractor. The RFP is then made available to perspective bidders, who 
have thirty days to bid on the contract (in certain circumstances the thirty day time limit is waived, and 
the contract can be awarded in a no-bid process). Once the contract is assigned to a company by a 
Contracting Officer, it is assigned to a Contracting Officer's Representative, who becomes the liaison 
between government and company.96 During the bidding process, the Contracting Officer will take a 
number of factors into account when making a decision, and will not necessarily choose the company 
which offers the lowest bid. Also, a number of resources are available to the officers, including a 
government database which tracks past behavior of contractors while under the employ of the U.S. 
Government.97 A number of issues have been identified within this process which can lead to problems 
with oversight and fairness.  
 
 2.2.3  The Law about the Employees of Private Military Companies  
 
 The law regarding the employees of PMCs operating in foreign countries is fraught with 
difficulties. Some of the most high profile incidents regarding PMCs in both Iraq and Afghanistan have 
been the conduct of their employees, and specifically their employees breaking various local laws 
without any seeming repercussions for the individuals themselves. The key questions in regards to this 
issue is what is the legal status of individuals employed by PMCs in a foreign country, and who is held 
accountable when certain actions occur, such as the use of lethal force by a civilian contractor. The 
current ambiguities in addressing these questions will be discussed in this section.  
 
  The Army Field Manual titled 'Contractors on the Battlefield', notes "Currently, there is no 
specifically identified force structure nor detailed policy on how to establish contractor management 
oversight within an AOR...only the contractor can directly supervise its employees. [my emphasis] The 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
96 Ibid, Jorgensen, 62. 
 
97 Federal Times, "Contractor Database Goes Public - With Limits.", The Federal Times, April 17, 2011, accessed  April 
17, 2011,  http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20110417/AGENCY01/104170303/. The contractor database is available 
at www.ppirs.gov/fapiis.html. 
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military chain of command exercises control through the contract."98 The U.S. government has taken a 
number of steps to rectify this, although its results have been inconclusive to this point. 
 
 An initial attempt in relation to the issue of accountability of civilian contractors was the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) in 2000, which allows for prosecution in the United 
States of  contractors who commit a crime while working overseas on a military contract. Originally 
worded to only include DOD contractors, it was amended in 2004 to include those under the employ of 
other federal agencies as well.99 While implemented to ensure contractors were held to certain legal 
standards which had been previously absent, it is unclear if the act has had much success; in the period 
from 2003-2008 in Iraq for example, only one individual was officially charged with a crime under the 
provisions of MEJA.100  
 
 A further effort at applying standards of accountability occurred in 2007, when the U.S. 
Congress amended the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to include 'civilian contractors 
during a contingency operation'.101 Originally the UCMJ specified only active war zones, the update 
would presumably take into account the increased use of contractors in various situations, such as post-
war Iraq and Afghanistan. It is unclear however, what the ultimate results of this change will be. 
Broadly, the adjustment in language may now require U.S. civilians to submit to military justice in the 
event of a crime being committed.102 More specifically, the UCMJ criminalizes many behaviors which 
are not in fact criminal to a civilian; thus how and if this will be applied to civilian contractors is 
somewhat unclear.103 
 
                                                
98 Nathan Hill, "Military Contracting - Too Much Dependence?" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 
2008), 13. 
 
99 Mike Doyle, "Law's Unclear if U.S. Can Prosecute Blackwater Guards.", McClatchy's News, December 9, 2008,  
accessed on April 10, 2011,  http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/12/09/57441/laws-unclear-if-us-can-prosecute.html. 
 
100 Elana Schor, "Report: U.S. Fails at Enforcing Prosecution of Contractors.", The Guardian, January 16, 2008, accessed 
April 15, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/16/iraq.usa. 
 
101 Ibid, Hill, 6. 
 
102 Mitchell McNaylor, "Mind the "Gap": Private Military Companies and the Rule of Law.", Yale Journal of International 
Affairs (Spring-Summer 2010): 6. 
 
103 Ibid, McNaylor, 7. 
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 While the contractors themselves are private citizens, they do have certain rights and 
responsibilities afforded to them by the government while under their employ. One of the key 
commitments which the government gives to civilian contractors is personnel recovery, similar to any 
uniformed military personnel.104 Under Department of Defense Directive 2310.2, and later updated via 
Directive 3002.01E in 2009, the military assigns itself the role of recovering any American civilian 
contractors employed by PMCs overseas.105 In the event of detention or capture by adversarial forces 
while under contract to the government, the Department of Defense will undertake activities to rescue 
contractors. As expected, this only extends to American contractors under the employ of the PMC, and 
not any host or third country nationals. 
  
 Similar to the section on the law on companies, it is clear that while current rules and 
regulations lend legitimacy to those individuals employed by PMCs, and protects them from labels of 
'mercenary' while providing military services, there is much ambiguity in interpretation of the various 
laws. These will be analyzed further in the section regarding issues with the law on individuals. 
  
 2.2.4  Issues with the Law on Companies 
  
 This section will briefly look at a number of the issues related to the law on companies, which 
exists to guide and regulate PMCs when under the employment of the U.S. Government. There are a 
number of deficiencies and loopholes which currently exist, making the legal umbrella covering PMCs 
less than ideal.  
 
 An initial look at the issues related to the law regarding PMCs would likely start with procedure 
and capacity. As indicated in the previous section, companies are guided by the provisions of ITAR and 
the FAR. Under these regulatory mechanisms, PMCs are meant to be properly vetted and reviewed, but 
the reality is far different. Although applications for license are subject to an internal review process 
involving multiple offices, there is little consistency in this process, and oftentimes a contract will be 
                                                
104 Ibid, Jorgensen, 63. 
 
105 Document available at http://www.aschq.army.mil/supportingdocs/d23102p.pdf. Document 3002.01E is available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300201p.pdf. 
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awarded by a lone department, bypassing the process altogether.106  Put simply, there are not enough 
resources dedicated to these bodies to effectively ensure the contracting process proceeds in the stated 
manner.107 In addition to this, under the provisions of ITAR, no formal procedures or body exists which 
focuses on oversight, it is done on an ad hoc basis as per the government, usually when an issue is 
identified, often publicly.108 Inevitably this means that 'oversight' in this situation is reactive in nature, 
as opposed to proactive, which is inherent to any process involving oversight.  
 
 Another component of the oversight issue is that of speed, both in the necessity to get the tasks 
specified in the offer off the ground and running, as well as the the time in which companies have to 
analyze a contract and prepare an offer. With two major deployments occurring simultaneously, the 
number of contracts made available to PMCs and the speed at which they needed to be filled often 
leave gaps in oversight and accountability. For example, when under strict time pressure, often 
government agencies did not have adequate time to analyze competing bids, and would take the lowest, 
with little regard to whether or not that company had the required know-how or experience for the 
job.109 Another issue emerges on fixed price contracts, where companies with less experience or poor 
reputations would under bid more established companies, who were more likely to provide a realistic 
cost projection.110 In cases like these, a combination of time pressure, government decision makers 
with little experience of the contracting process or understanding of their own security needs, as well as 
less than honest bidding firms combined to create clear opportunities for fraud and corruption within 
the process. 
  
 Further issues arise in the classification of PMC employees. In one well known case, the firm 
Blackwater (later known as Xe) was accused of classifying their workers as 'independent contractors' as 
                                                
106 Caroline Holmqvist, "Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation." SIPRI Policy Paper No. 9, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (January 2005): 61-62. 
 
107 Ibid, Jennings, 30. 
 
108 Ibid, Jennings, 30. 
 
109  David Isenberg, "A Government in Search of Cover: PMCs in Iraq." Paper prepared for “Market Forces: Regulating 
Private Military Companies,” March 23-24, 2006 conference, Institute for International Law and Justice, New York 
University School of Law.  
 
110  Ibid, Isenberg, 15. 
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opposed to employees, allowing them bid on and receive nearly $150 million in contracts reserved for 
small businesses, as well as avoid $50 million in withholding taxes.111 In another, the firm Custer 
Battles was convicted of 37 cases of fraud in regards to its contracts in Iraq, costing the U.S. 
Government $50 million.112 Numerous examples similar to this have occurred over the course of the 
wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Instances of fraud and corruption have occurred regarding 
classification, overcharging for services, paying protection money (which allegedly found its way to 
insurgents), and a number of other types, perhaps the most pervasive issue that of the revolving door 
between the public and private sector. 
 
 In 2009, an investigation by the congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting found a 
number of major issues regarding contractors and corruption, namely that the disparate nature of the 
governmental contracting process fostered an environment which encouraged corruption and fraud.113 
They also provided a number of recommendations to the federal government to rectify these issues, but 
it is yet to be determined whether they will be implemented. Regardless, it is clear that current U.S. 
laws and regulations have hardly kept pace with the rapidly evolving industry of private contracting.  
  
 2.2.5 Issues with the Law on Individuals 
  
 This section will look at a number of select themes within the topic of issues related to 
individuals who are employed by PMCs; specifically what laws and regulations govern them, and who 
they are accountable to when deployed to a combat zone. Similar to the laws regarding the PMCs 
themselves, current laws leave much to be desired, and a number of high profile incidents have 
occurred in which PMC employees escaped any punishment for serious crimes committed while under 
contract. While there are a myriad of issues related to the laws on individuals, this section will focus on 
a few themes within the topic of legislation which establishes the legal status of individuals who are 
                                                
111  Karen DeYoung, "Democrat Calls for Blackwater Probe, Alleges Tax Fraud." The Boston Globe, March 11, 2008, 
accessed April 25, 2011, 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2008/03/11/democrat_calls_for_blackwater_probe_alleges_tax_
fraud/. 
 
112  David Isenberg, "Challenges of Security Privatization in Iraq.", in Private Actors and Security Governance. Alan 
Bryden, Marina Caparini.  (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007): 156-157. 
 
113  Commission on Wartime Contracting. "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.", Interim 
Report to Congress, June 2009, accessed September 14, 2011, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/reports. 
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employed by American PMCs operating in a combat zone, and their accountability when the law is 
broken. 
 
 It is important to note that while contractors are generally covered by three layers of laws and 
regulations; that of international law, the domestic law of the country they are operating in, and the 
laws of country in which their employer (PMC) is based,114 this section will focus solely on the third 
layer, that of U.S. law. International law tends to address the topic of mercenarism,115 a definition 
which PMCs and their employees easily avoid, while the domestic law of a nation in which PMCs 
operate is either subverted entirely, as was the case in Iraq, where the CPA ruled that contractors were 
immune from domestic Iraqi law116, or local justice mechanisms simply do not have the capacity to 
investigate and prosecute violations, as was and is the case in Afghanistan.117 Therefore this section 
will look solely at what U.S. laws and regulations were and are used to hold individual contractors 
accountable for their actions while in theater.  
 
 While certain laws and regulations regarding the use of contractors on the battlefield predated 
the conflict in Afghanistan, the U.S. Government quickly realized that existing legislation was 
insufficient to handle the proliferation of contractors following the early 2000's. As mentioned in a 
previous section, the Army Field Manual clearly states that oversight of individuals employed by 
PMCs lies strictly with the PMC itself. In this instance the Army is explicitly admitting that it simply 
had no mechanism or capacity to oversee the contractors working in theater. By indicating that only a 
contractor can supervise its own employees, one can begin to see the potential difficulties which could 
arise in a situation in where accountability for nearly all other personnel lies within the military 
command structure. Although the U.S. took a number of steps to clarify laws and regulations designed 
to govern contractor behavior, it is clear a number of major gaps still exist.  
                                                
114  Jennifer Elsea, Moshe Schwartz and Kennon Nakamura, "Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal     
Status and Other Issues." U.S. Congressional Research Service. August 25, 2008, accessed May 18, 2011, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf, 14. 
 
115  Yves Sandoz, “Private Security and International Law.” in Cilliers and Mason, Peace, Profit or Plunder? 
 
116  Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: The Bremer Edicts." Council on Foreign Relations Backrounder. July 8, 2004, accessed May 
18, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-bremer-edicts/p7639.  
 
117  Antoine Bossenkool, "U.S. Wartime Contract Fraud Expected to Increase.", Defense News. May 24, 2010, accessed 
May 20, 2011, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4640719.  
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 While MEJA offers a concrete way for individuals, specifically contractors, to be prosecuted for 
offenses committed while abroad, reality has shown that it has little effect in practice. Federal 
prosecutors have to date shown little desire to prosecute individuals using it, while states which host 
PMC headquarters in the United States have also shown little appetite for prosecuting PMC 
personnel.118 Furthermore, despite a 2005 amendment which upgraded MEJA from only applying to 
Department of Defense contractors to include "contractors supporting the mission of the Department of 
Defense"119, questions over whether contractors under the employ of the State Department or other 
government agencies fall under MEJA persist.120 The firm Blackwater, for instance, argued that their 
employees were not subject to MEJA after an incident in which 17 Iraqi civilians were killed, since 
they were at the time under the employ of the State Department. A Federal judge threw out the case in 
2009, although it had been reopened by an appeals court at the time of writing.121 The application of 
MEJA in terms of prosecutions has been decidedly light. From 2000-2008 only 12 individuals were 
officially charged under its provisions, a number of these contractors.122 It is likely that the lack of clear 
precedents regarding the application of MEJA to contractors will continue this trend. 
 
 The alternate option for regulation of civilian contractors, the UCMJ, is also far from robust. 
Although as mentioned previously it was updated to include 'contingency operations'123, as Iraq and 
Afghanistan are now defined, and not solely war as declared by Congress, it is not yet clear whether 
constitutionally the UCMJ can apply to civilians. For one, treating civilians the same as soldiers legally 
can leave them open to punishment for violations such as fraternization or drunkenness, neither of 
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which is illegal for civilians.124 Although it is highly unlikely an attempt to prosecute a civilian for one 
of these 'minor' offenses would occur125, it raises further questions regarding the accountability of 
contractors. For example, under the UCMJ it is illegal to disobey a superior officer. In the case of a 
civilian contractor however, what exactly defines a superior officer? Their force structure exists outside 
the direct military chain of command, so it would be nearly impossible to determine definitively who 
was a superior officer and whether a contractor could be prosecuted for disobeying that person, under 
the UCMJ.126 The waters are muddied further regarding the UCMJ when considering the case of a 
soldier who was exempted from justice as per UCMJ regulations as he had been discharged and thus 
the UCMJ could no longer be applied to him. If this precedent were followed, a PMC could simply fire 
an employee, providing immunity.127 
 
 Although both MEJA and the UCMJ provide guidance and an established legal framework for 
holding contractors accountable, neither has yet proven to be an effective tool in doing so. The reasons 
for this mainly lie in the fact that courts are hesitant to utilize them with so much constitutional 
uncertainty surrounding them, while also having no major precedents to guide them, although this may 
soon change with a number of cases in progress.128 The likelihood of a constitutional challenge to any 
potential prosecution using these new statues has resulted in a widespread reluctance by courts to take 
on these cases.129 
 
 While multiple layers of laws exist to govern contractor behavior, it is U.S. law which holds the 
most weight in providing accountability for contractors. However, this section has shown that there are 
a number of major issues within U.S. laws and regulations, the result being that it has been very 
                                                
124  William Matthews, "Some UCMJ Rules Now Cover U.S. Contractors." Navy Times, January 5, 2007, accessed May 5, 
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difficult to prosecute American contractors for crimes committed while abroad in a combat zone. A 
combination of vague legal definitions, lack of solid precedent and overlapping statutes and regulations 
results in an environment which is not conducive to holding individual contractors accountable. 
 
 2.3 Current U.S. Policies on the Use of Contractors 
 
 This section will introduce current U.S. Government policies on the use of PMCs operating in 
war zones. A number of clear themes emerge when analyzing this particular aspect of PMC operations. 
Mainly, from a technical standpoint clearly established and communicated policy did not emerge from 
the U.S. Government and specifically the DOD regarding PMCs until much later during the 
Afghanistan conflict, around 2008-2009. Although official policy guidance did exist prior to this time, 
it was not applied on a consistent basis, and the U.S. Government generally failed to provide a clear 
definition of the role PMCs were permitted to play in combat operations.130 This lack of clarity did not 
only apply to the use of armed contractors, but also to the general use of contractors in other support 
functions as well.131 Many consider this lack of clear policy direction and subsequent oversight directly 
linked to abuses, corruption and even damaging overall counterinsurgency aims by alienating local 
populations.132 This lack of clarity is also in stark contrast to the broad trend of privatization which 
occurred since the mid-1980's, and accelerated rapidly following 2001. 
 
 Policy on the use of contractors in their current form by the U.S. Government can be traced to 
the creation of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) by the U.S. Army in 1985.133 Its 
primary intent was to "cover the planning process for the use of civilian contractors during wartime 
situations."134 Practically speaking, this regulation opened the door for the mass privatization of various 
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support functions, such as providing food or mechanical repair services. This steady trend towards 
privatization continued throughout the late 1980's and through the 1990's, with further budget cuts and 
troop reductions the main drivers.  
 
 At the core of policy related to governmental use of PMCs in combat zones is the previously 
discussed concept of an 'inherently governmental function'. U.S. Government policy indicates that only 
functions falling outside those considered 'inherently governmental' can be completed by contractors. 
While policy guidance tools, such as the OMB Circular, DOD regulation 1100.22135 and the FAIR act 
provide broad guidance on what these functions are, such as 'significantly affecting the life, liberty or 
property interests of private persons'136, as well as specific functions which fall within or outside the 
definition, the reality is that PMCs often simply ignore their directives in carrying out their duties.  
 
 From a technical and doctrinal standpoint, policy drivers in relation to contracting existed from 
the mid-1980's onward, even if vague and unclear. From a practical perspective however, the 
appointment of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2001 brought about a rapid increase in the 
number of contractors, both armed and unarmed, in Iraq and Afghanistan.137 In the case of Iraq, 
Rumsfeld pushed for smaller troop numbers, utilizing an extreme technological advantage to rapidly 
defeat adversarial forces. However, reduced troop figures then required PMCs to take on static and 
mobile security functions, among many others, which resulted in a rapid proliferation of private 
contractors on the ground.138 Similarly in Afghanistan, a deteriorating security situation, some believe 
caused in part by the presence of too few troops, led to multiple NGOs withdrawing to Kabul, or 
leaving the country entirely, such as MSF, and a rapid increase in private contractors.139  
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 The stark contrast between the application of 'policy' versus the codified policy itself is best 
surmised by the fact that it was not until 2008-2009 that Congress forced the Secretary of Defense, 
through legislation, to provide clearer guidance on the use of PMCs.140 This indicates that in the seven 
to eight years of conflict in Afghanistan prior to this time, there was likely little consistency in the 
application of policy. This lack of clearly established and adhered to written guidance did not deter or 
prevent the rapid proliferation of PMCs in Afghanistan however. The generally unclear nature of policy 
directives however would have clear implications on PMC activities in Afghanistan however, which 
will be explored further later on.  
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Chapter 3 - The U.S. in Afghanistan - Counterinsurgency 
 
 This chapter will introduce all aspects of the current COIN campaign in Afghanistan, mainly 
focused on the U.S.'s involvement, and the range of actors in an adversarial capacity. It will review the 
policy that drives U.S. COIN activities, introduce the legal basis upon which it rests, briefly introduce 
the insurgent actors opposed to U.S., ISAF and Afghan forces, before concluding with information 
regarding the geographic context in which the campaign takes place. 
 
 3.1 U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy  
 
 This section will briefly discuss U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) policy during the Afghanistan 
war, while also highlighting the legal basis for U.S. operations. The policy, strategy and execution of 
COIN goals in Afghanistan by U.S. forces have been a hotly debated and contentious issue from the 
war's beginning. The purpose of this section is only to introduce some of the themes and drivers present 
in U.S. policy on COIN, as an in depth analysis would require far more space than is available here. 
The section will review U.S. actions from the beginning of the conflict, and the evolution of policy as 
the war progressed into the Obama administration, and to the present. The policy guiding U.S. COIN 
activities is key to understanding some of the later themes regarding the use of PMCs as part of the 
overall war effort.  
 
 The initial stages of the war were characterized by a very light footprint in terms of U.S. troop 
numbers, with overwhelming firepower, mainly from precision air support, quickly routing the Taliban 
and their allied conventional forces. After the Taliban had been defeated and removed from the seat of 
power in Kabul, their forces mainly fled over the eastern border into the tribal areas of Pakistan, or 
quietly retreated to their traditional Pashtun base in the south. From here, the insurgency emerged, and 
the subsequent COIN campaign by U.S. and eventually ISAF forces141 began. 
 
                                                
141  ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, was created under the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Initially it was to 
act as a U.N. mandated force to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority to create a secure environment in the Kabul 
region. Beginning in 2003 it expanded operations to various parts of the country, and eventually included nearly 50 
nations. More detailed information on ISAF and its operations can be found at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html. 
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 Although a contentious subject, most analysts will agree that the COIN campaign in 
Afghanistan could be characterized by lacking a unifying strategy or approach over the course of the 
war and a lack of coordination between the various players involved.142 Over time, various strategies 
have been employed, by both the U.S. and other ISAF member nations in their areas of operations, with 
little consistency, or application of institutional memory in terms of what has been successful and what 
has not.143 Perhaps most telling is the fact that the U.S. Military's recognized primary guide to COIN, 
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, was not even published until 2006, Generals David Petraeus and James 
Amos noting in the foreword, "It has been 20 years since the Army published a field manual devoted 
exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years."144 
 
 The initial COIN efforts following the end of conventional conflict mainly consisted of small 
detachments of U.S. Special Forces (SF) working with indigenous forces and populations to kinetically 
target Taliban and specifically al-Qaeda assets, as well as work with locals to win their trust, by 
providing security and initiating reconstruction projects.145 Working from remote areas mainly in the 
south and east of the country, U.S. SF saw a number of successes, while taking minimal casualties 
during this time period, from 2003-2004.146 Led at this point by Lt. General David Barno, U.S. forces 
at this stage also began to introduce Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a combination of civil 
and military forces whose primary goals were to: "increase security through providing military 
presence and working with Afghan forces, strengthening the reach of the Afghan central government, 
and facilitating reconstruction through improvement of the security sector."147. The PRT's main focus 
was to secure a specific piece of territory, a village or group of villages, their presence allowing for 
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146  David S Clukey, "A District Approach to Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency." (Masters diss., USNPGS, December 
2009), accessed August 24, 2011, smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/415-clukey.pdf, 12. 
 
147  Ibid, 248. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
45 
security against Taliban attacks, while also beginning reconstruction and development projects.148 In 
this way, local populations could begin to identify with and recognize the contribution of the central 
government, not a common concept in Afghanistan.  
 
 Although the idea and actions of the PRTs produced some positives results, there were a 
number of factors which prevented overall COIN efforts from being successful over the long term. A 
primary issue mainly identified by analysts for the failure to quell the overall insurgency was the 
insufficient amount of troops dedicated to COIN on the ground in country.149 Traditional COIN 
literature generally calls for 20 dedicated COIN personnel for every 1,000 civilians in order to create 
and maintain stability; with the numbers of foreign forces falling far below this ratio, and indigenous 
Afghan forces not yet up to the task of dedicated counterinsurgency for much of the conflict, it 
becomes clear why many felt this to be a major stumbling block.150 Although troop figures did increase 
substantially over the course of the war, from around 5,000 in 2002 to over 70,000 by 2010, this was 
still not considered sufficient for the complex COIN operation at hand. This lack of troops contributed 
to a number of other perceived negative results; for example an inability to hold an area led to the 
increased use of 'raiding' tactics, which would further alien te civilian populations151, while the lack of 
troops combined with Afghanistan’s harsh geography made living among the population, or 
establishing 'presence', extremely difficult.152 
 
 Overall, despite an increase in troop levels, and a combined force of over 200,000 troops and 
police by 2009-2010 dedicated to combating insurgency, the Taliban and their allies have still yet to be 
defeated, with Taliban influence even growing substantially over that time period. Some estimates even 
identify them as active in up to 75% of the country by 2009.153 A deteriorating security situation and 
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increased U.S./ISAF casualties could generally characterize the course of the war from its early stages 
until 2010.  
 
 The evolution of U.S. policy regarding COIN in Afghanistan can be broken down to a number 
of key areas. After the initial military victory, efforts were focused on small groups of SF forces 
obtaining kinetic victories over Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, while establishing relationships and 
presence within local communities. This was the birth of the strategy defined as 'clear-hold-build' in 
Chapter Five of FM3-24.154 By removing insurgents from an area, physically remaining in that area to 
provide security, and subsequently building indigenous institutions, in areas of 'overt insurgent 
activity'155, SF saw minimal casualties and increased successes. 
 
 As time progressed, identifiable operational shifts occurred, whereby an increased focus was 
put on launching search and destroy missions from large, generally isolated from the population 
forward operating bases (FOB), in which the metrics relevant to U.S./ISAF commanders were 
insurgent body counts and weapons/contraband recovered.156 In conjunction with this, over the time 
period 2005-2010, a visible shift in priorities from the local/district to the national/provincial took 
place, in terms of engagement by the national government.157 Measuring the practical results of this 
shift is difficult, as a myriad of other factors also come into play. However, one cannot ignore the 
significantly higher casualties; 200 U.S./ISAF fatalities from 2001-2004, 2,081 from 2005-2010158, as 
well as increased instability and Taliban control/influence throughout various parts of the country.  
 
 As this operational shift occurred, the increase in troop figures brought a corresponding increase 
in contractor figures, the effects of which will be explored in later sections. U.S. COIN policy and 
strategy also had significant impacts on PMCs engaging in combat. Since the COIN effort evolved to 
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encompass over 200 FOBs spread out across the country, the logistics of resupplying these outposts 
were by nature quite complex, due to various geographic, political and military challenges. PMCs can 
to play a crucial role in ensuring the safety and success of these resupply functions, as well as 
protecting the FOBs and other static sites themselves, both of which will be the focus of analysis in this 
work. 
 
 3.2 Legal Basis of U.S. COIN Efforts 
 
 From a legal standpoint, U.S. COIN activities were initially governed by diplomatic notes 
exchanged between the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2002 
and 2003.159 These notes covered a range of topics, but only dedicated a few lines to actual warfighting, 
specifically the 'conduct of ongoing military operations'160 The notes themselves are also only two 
pages in length.161 In terms of their direct relevance to U.S. combat operations, they gave U.S. forces 
the equivalent of diplomatic immunity, exempting them from Afghan legal jurisdiction.162 Naturally 
many consider that such vague and brief guidelines dictating the legal boundaries of U.S. operations 
are problematic.163 In 2005, a more expansive joint declaration was signed by Presidents Karzai and 
Bush, which covered such COIN related issues as counterterrorism operations, ANSF training 
programs and intelligence sharing, among others.164  
 
 3.3 The Insurgency 
 
 This section will introduce the insurgency and subsequent counterinsurgency campaign in 
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Afghanistan, which emerged following initial military action in the country in 2001. It will begin with a 
brief historical background of the insurgency, mainly from 2002-2010, followed by a discussion of its 
main components and characteristics, before moving into the policy and legal framework of the U.S. 
counterinsurgency campaign. This will provide important context in terms of the environment in which 
PMCs operated in following the initial invasion in 2001. It will also show how U.S. legal and policy 
directives, along with the reality of the insurgency on the ground facilitated the use and proliferation of 
PMCs in country.  
 
 3.3.1 Historical Background 
 
 In late September and early October, the CIA began inserting small teams into Northern 
Alliance held areas of Afghanistan, liaising with various NA commanders to begin the assault on the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda.165 Officially beginning on October 7th, 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom 
aimed to destroy the capability of the Taliban government to wage war, and prevent the use of 
Afghanistan as an operating base for al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.166 As Fall turned into Winter 
the CIA along with inserted Special Forces (SF) soldiers began to coordinate air strikes against Taliban 
and AQ positions, allowing the forces of various commanders, such as Mohammad Fahim, Abdul 
Rashid Dostum and Atta Muhammad Noor in the North and Hamid Karzai in the South to make rapid 
progress.167 The technological superiority of U.S. forces, specifically the ability of SF assets to direct 
air power to a devastating degree of accuracy, quickly led to the downfall of the Taliban and AQ as a 
conventional fighting force. As Operation Enduring Freedom evolved, its early stages were 
characterized by small, generally decentralized units of SF working closely with Afghan tribal forces to 
pursue and engage Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in various strategically important areas of the country. 
Following their conventional defeat, the Taliban, their foreign allies within al-Qaeda, and a number of 
other groups began an insurgency which has enveloped the country ever since.  
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 Following the initial invasion and offensive by combined U.S. and Northern Alliance forces, the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda could no longer operate as a conventional fighting force. At this point, the 
remnants of these forces, along with a number of other groups, initiated an insurgency against the U.S. 
and eventual ISAF forces as well as the GIRoA. The number of participants in the insurgency varied 
throughout the course of the conflict, but six groups can be identified as playing major roles in the 
insurgency.168 They are the Taliban, foreign militants (mainly al-Qaeda), Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani 
Network, criminal groups, and local tribes.169 Most prominent of these would be the first four, as they 
upped the tempo of the insurgency as time passed, taking back increased control of areas within their 
zones of influence as the decade wore on. Although there has been some evidence of increased 
coordination between the various groups, likely through meetings in tribal areas of Pakistan, a unified 
leadership is not a characteristic across the insurgency.170 
 
 3.3.2 The Taliban 
 
 The Taliban was formed in the Fall of 1994 in Kandahar, by ethnic Pashtun religious students 
schooled at various Pakistani madrassas.171 Led by Mullah Omar, two years after their founding they 
had emerged from the south to capture both Jalalabad and Kabul. Applying an extremely strict 
interpretation of Islam, they ruled over two-thirds of the country from 1997 until their ouster by U.S. 
and Northern Alliance forces in late 2001. Following their defeat as a conventional military force, and 
their removal from the seat of government in Kabul, they fled to Pakistan's North-west Frontier 
Province, which abuts the north-eastern section of Afghanistan.172 From here they regrouped, and 
began a protracted insurgency against the GIRoA and coalition forces which has been marked by 
various levels of intensity, depending on a number of factors.  
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 A number of key components characterize the Taliban insurgency. Firstly, the porous nature of 
the Afghan/Pakistani border, combined with the fact that the Pashtun ethnic group is split between the 
two nations, greatly influences the Taliban's ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan, while finding 
safe havens in Pakistan.173 The second major component is many analysts’ belief that the Taliban is 
directly aided by the Pakistani ISI, who provides various forms of support, enabling them to maintain 
an active insurgency.174 Although their traditional powerbase is in the Pashtun south of the country, 
they have expanded their operations and influence to a number of northern areas of Afghanistan 
including Kunduz province and a number of others.175 
 
 3.3.3 Hizb-i-Islami 
 
 Hizb-i-Islami is an insurgent group located mainly in the the northeastern part of Afghanistan, 
and the adjacent Pakistani border regions.176 Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it was one of the primary 
insurgent groups supported by both the CIA and ISI during the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan during the 1980's. After a stint as Prime Minister following Soviet withdrawal, Hekmatyar 
began living in Iran starting in 1996, until returning to Afghanistan in 2002.177 Re-consolidating forces 
and control around his traditional area of influence near Jalalabad, Hekmatyar began a concerted 
insurgency against U.S., GIRoA and coalition forces. Named a 'specially designated global terrorist' by 
the United States in 2003, he has continued operating in concert with the Taliban, the Haqqani network 
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and other groups mainly in the northeastern part of Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan.178 
Hekmatyar, a recipient of U.S. and Pakistani largesse during the resistance to Soviet occupation, 
narrowly avoided assassination by a missile fired from a CIA operated Predator drone in 2002.179 
Hekmatyar and Hezb-i-Islami upped the tempo of their attacks on GIRoA and ISAF targets beginning 
in 2008, cementing his role as one of the primary leaders of the insurgency.180 
 
 3.3.4 Haqqani Network 
  
 Led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, the network has emerged as one of the most formidable opponents 
to GIRoA and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Originating from Khost in eastern Afghanistan, Haqqani 
moved to Miram Shah in neighboring North Waziristan Province, Pakistan in the mid 1970's.181 One of 
the main insurgent groups in the battle against the Soviets, Haqqani also received significant aid from 
the CIA and Pakistan ISI and is now considered to be a favorite of rich Middle Eastern backers.182  
 
 Although structurally separate from the Taliban, with their base of operations mainly in the 
eastern part of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the group does seem to take guidance from the Quetta Shura, 
the main Taliban leadership council, on the path of insurgency.183 The Haqqanis also do not limit their 
operations to their home areas; they have also carried out a number of high profile attacks on targets in 
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Kabul, and other GIRoA and ISAF targets.184 Many analysts also consider the Haqqanis to be one the 
groups most entwined with Pakistani intelligence.185 Using their Pakistani base to conduct operations 
over the border in Afghanistan, it uses its tribal loyalties and links with the ISI to ensure its continuity 
and safety in the area.186 
  
 3.3.5 Al-Qaeda/Foreign Militants 
 
 Although now reduced in number and influence, the presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was 
what initially brought U.S. and ISAF forces into the country. Having been born during the fight against 
the Soviets in the late 1980's, through the money and resources of Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda moved 
its base of operations to Sudan in 1991, only to return to Afghanistan after the Taliban took power in 
1996.187 A highly decentralized group of fighters from various regions, including multiple Arab 
countries as well as from Central Asia and the Caucus, they proved to be fierce fighters in the battle 
against Northern Alliance and eventually U.S./ISAF forces.188 Ideologically and objective wise, their 
main aims are to: establish the rule of God on earth, attain martyrdom in the cause of God, and purify 
the ranks of Islam from elements of depravity.189 
 
 As U.S./ISAF & GIRoA forces increased the pressure on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, they were 
forced to relocate their base of operations to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
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Pakistan in 2001-2002.190 Although it is difficult to gauge the exact number of al-Qaeda fighters still in 
Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence officials were estimating the number to be as low as 100 in 2009.191 A 
number of other groups of foreign fighters also are active in Afghanistan, most notably the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a collection of Islamist fighters from Central Asia.192 
  
 3.4 Geography 
 
 Analyzing history, it is clear that the geographic characteristics of a nation play a crucial role in 
any insurgency. In the case of Afghanistan, this geography perhaps plays a more critical role than 
nearly anywhere else. Landlocked, extremely rugged terrain, porous borders and unstable neighbors, 
Afghanistan has all the characteristics suitable for an insurgency. In addition to this, climate also plays 
a major factor; from roughly October to April sustained campaigns are virtually impossible due to 
snow.193  
 
 Briefly, Afghanistan can be described as 'land of highlands and lowlands'194, with the 
population naturally mainly living in the lowlands. Historically, lowland dwelling tribal fighters 
quickly and easily take to the mountains in times of war; the mountains offer sanctuary from 
conventional adversaries and offer a good base to conduct raids into lowland areas. Due in part to this 
geography, no force, whether foreign or domestic, has ever been able to claim complete control over all 
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of Afghanistan's tribes.195 
 
 A number of long and tall mountain ranges spread across Afghanistan from east to west, with 
the Hindu Kush dividing the northern provinces from the remainder of the country, while unstable or 
downright hostile neighbors share nearly every border. For U.S./ISAF forces the primary challenge is 
supplying a concerted COIN effort with such difficult geo-political factors in place. The most 
straightforward resupply route is via Iran to the southwest; for political reasons this is not an option. 
The same goes for Turkmenistan to the north, leaving only Pakistan and Central Asia, neither ideal 
options for reasons ranging from instability (the former) to time and expense (the latter).196 For 
U.S./ISAF forces, these geographic (and related political) realities mean that by the later stages of the 
war, nearly 80 percent of its cargo and 40 percent of its fuel requirements for operations in Afghanistan 
were required to transit Pakistan.197 This reliance on limited supply routes can result in disruption or 
even the suspension of supplies reaching U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan, as militants have increased 
attacks on these routes.198 This difficult geography, and the resulting limited options for resupply 
routes, has major implications regarding the overall COIN effort and the use of PMCs by U.S./ISAF 
forces. 
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Chapter 4 - PMCs in Afghanistan - Introduction 
  
 This section aims to introduce some of the themes related to PMCs in combat, as part of the 
overall COIN effort in Afghanistan. It will begin by introducing the concept and definition of combat, 
as it pertains to security contractors in Afghanistan, before moving on to the statistics and figures 
currently available regarding PMCs in the country. Following this there will be a number of sections 
detailing instances of PMC activities, with a focus on their combat roles. From these descriptions 
emerge a number of key themes, which will be covered in depth.  
  
 There are a few items which deserve emphasis in terms of the content of this section. The first, 
also mentioned in the literature review, is that primary source information is extremely difficult to 
obtain, due to Afghanistan's status as an active war zone, and PMCs natural reluctance to divulge 
information. Therefore much of the material in this section derives from declassified U.S. government 
investigations, supported by the work of analysts, researchers and journalists from a number of sectors. 
Another item of note, related to the sources of information, is the predominance of available 
information related specifically to DOD contractors, as opposed to those employed by other American 
organizations, such as the CIA, the State Department or U.S.AID. Although some information on 
PMCs employed by these organizations is available, it is dwarfed by that on those PMCs employed by 
the DOD.  
 The second main item regarding the content is the relative dearth of information regarding 
PMCs operating in Afghanistan from 2001-2006 and even later in the conflict. This has a number of 
likely explanations, the most probable being that with a light troop footprint in the early stages of the 
war, contractors were less present than they were in the later stages. In addition, public and 
Congressional consciousness of PMCs operating in Afghanistan was not widespread (likely due to 
increased focus on Iraq from 2003 onward) until a number of high profile incidents occurred in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan involving PMCs. The practical result of this is that the majority of primary 
information comes from the time period of 2008-2011. 
 
 Considering the above, the following sections will look at various aspects of PMCs in 
counterinsurgency combat in Afghanistan. It will approach the topic through three general 
classifications. These are: static and mobile security, individual security and finally covert action. By 
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far the most common occurrence of contractors engaging in combat is while conducting static or 
mobile security and most often while protecting convoys.199 Therefore the bulk of this particular 
chapter will focus on the section related to this aspect. Following these sections, a number of themes 
will be identified regarding contractors in combat, and how this has influenced the overall COIN 
campaign by U.S./ISAF forces.  
 
  4.1 Combat 
 
 As discussed in previous sections, the traditional idea of 'combat' as it pertains to the 
Afghanistan conflict involves governmental actors, whether they be U.S., ISAF or GIRoA, engaging 
adversarial forces, mainly the Taliban, al-Qaeda and various other insurgent groups. Combat itself is 
categorized by the U.S. as an 'inherently governmental function', which prohibits private actors from 
engaging in it, ostensibly including PMC personnel. The reality on the ground, however, is far different 
in that PMC personnel are regularly called upon to undertake combat functions, often as part of their 
contractual obligations. The U.S. Congressional Research Service categorizes contractors in two ways, 
those providing 'armed services' and 'unarmed services'.200 Armed services include 'static site security, 
convoy security, security escorts and personal security details.'201 Naturally contractors performing 
these roles must engage in what widely would be considered 'combat' at times in the course of their 
duties; if attacked by insurgents, a PMC contractor is contractually obligated to defend the convoy, site, 
or individual which they are protecting. Whether or not they are actually 'combatants' is an issue of 
interpretation, and varies depending on the specific circumstances, and who is making the 
assessment.202 For the purposes of this section, combat will be defined at a more basic level (as covered 
                                                
199  In one study of security incidents recorded by the DOD from June 2009 - April 2010, 72% of PMC personnel fatalities 
(188 out of a total of 260), occurred during convoy protection missions. Moshe Schwartz. "Statement of Moshe 
Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition, U.S. Congressional Research Service."  House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, hearing on The Investigation of 
Protection Payments for Safe Passage Along the Afghan Supply Chain. June 22, 2010, accessed September 1, 2011, 
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS_Subcommittee/6.22.10_HNT_HEARING/Schw
artz__Statement.pdf , 6-7. 
 
200  Ibid, Schwartz,"Statement," 3-5. 
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in the terminology section), as 'a fight or contest between individuals or groups'203 within the overall 
insurgency campaign. This took various forms, which will be presented in the following sections. 
 
  4.2 The Figures 
  
 Consistent and accurate figures on the number of PMCs and contractors active in Afghanistan 
over the course of the war are notoriously difficult to come by. There are a number of reasons for this. 
The first is that various different organizations utilize PMCs as part of their efforts in the overall COIN 
campaign, and until the more recent attention by Congress, no major efforts to aggregate or report this 
data have occurred.204 The result is that while data exists, it is disproportionally from certain 
organizations, is for specific time periods, and can be highly unreliable. For example, ample 
information on PMCs employed by the DOD during the time period 2009-2010 is available, less so is 
aggregated information on USAID contractors employed from 2003-2005. A second result of this 
overall lack of oversight and accountability is that often the organizations themselves don't actually 
know how many contractors they employ.205 One clear theme to emerge from the limited figures 
available is that the amount of contractors in Afghanistan has grown rapidly; as troop levels saw a 
massive increase from the early stages of the war, so did contractor figures.206 This section will 
introduce a number of themes present in the data available in the early stages of the war, then the later 
stages, in which far more data sets were available, before reviewing some overall figures on contractors 
over the course of the entire conflict.  
 
   
                                                
203  Ibid, Merriam Webster. 
 
204  John P Hutton, "Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of Contractors Supporting Contract 
and Grant Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan." GAO Report to Congressional Committees. U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. April 2010, accessed September 5, 2011, www.gao.gov/new.items/d10357.pdf.  
 
205  In reference to a Freedom of Information Act request by ePluribus Media's Susie Dow in 2007, regarding the number of 
contractors employed by USAID in Iraq, the organization replied "...USAID does not aggregate the kind of information 
for which you are asking." It is presumed this is also true for Afghanistan.  Susie Dow, "USAID: We don't know how 
many contractors we have working for us in Iraq." ePluribus Media, September 19, 2007, accessed September 5, 2011, 
http://www.epluribusmedia.org/features/2007/20070727_USAID_does_not_know.html. 
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 4.2.1 Early Stages of the Conflict 
  
 As mentioned, complete figures on the use of contractors in Afghanistan from the early stages 
of war are not available, for a number of reasons. The DOD, State Department and USAID, the three 
main U.S. employers of contractors in country, all had varying and sometimes non-existent reporting 
requirements.207 In a number of cases, the agencies claimed that they had transparent reporting 
mechanisms, but were proved patently false by investigations by various committees and NGOs.208 In 
addition, it has been shown that even information provided by the various agencies has proved to be 
incorrect.209  
 
 The most comprehensive aggregated figures available regarding contractors in Afghanistan 
from the early stages of the war, 2001-2003, comes from the Center for Public Integrity. Describing 
themselves as 'one of the country's oldest and largest nonpartisan, nonprofit investigative news 
organizations,"210 they conducted an investigation of contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan for the period 
of 2001-2003, submitting 73 FOIA requests to the DOD, State Department and USAID.211 Noticeably 
absent from this list is the CIA, who is not required to provide information under the FOIA due to the 
secretive nature of their activities. They found that in Afghanistan these three organizations had 
awarded 45 contracts overall, USAID awarding 16 contracts worth over $260 million collectively, 
State awarding five contracts worth over $53 million, and the DOD awarding over $1.3 billion over 24 
contracts.212 In addition, the three agencies shared a contract with Ronco Consulting Corp. for over $12 
million.213 The services rendered under these contracts, 45 in total handed out to 45 different 
companies, varied, from construction and logistics, to security. These figures can hardly be 
characterized as a complete picture, however, as the CPI indicates they received inconsistent and 
                                                
207  Maud Beelman, "U.S. Contractors Reap the Windfalls of Post-War Reconstruction." Center for Public Integrity, 
October 30, 2003, accessed September 10, 2011, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=65.  
 
208  Ibid, Beelman. 
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incomplete information from all three agencies, even filing suit against the DOD and State Department 
after they would not comply with the requests.214 
 
 As the agencies were not required to provide detailed information on the nature of the contracts 
or services actually rendered, it is difficult to extrapolate the number of companies who were 
conducting 'armed services' during this time period. One exception is DynCorp, whose contract with 
the State Department in Afghanistan became available following the publishing of the CPI report in 
2003.215 Its initial contract with the State Department for this time period called for the company to 
begin providing security for President Hamid Karzai, previously the remit of U.S. SF and the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security216 The contract, which had a maximum ceiling of over $80 million, was not made 
available for competitive bidding from other companies, the State Department noting: "There is no 
other contractor that can handle this current mission without delays....formal market research was not 
conducted, due to the urgency of the requirement."217 In addition to protecting Karzai, the mammoth 
200 pages contract also calls for DynCorp to provide protection services for the U.S. Embassy in 
Kabul, as well as the Presidential Compound.218 
 
 Aside from the CPI's wide ranging report, little else is available in terms of figures from this 
time period on contractors in Afghanistan. What is available, specifically related to combat, mainly 
takes the form of newspaper articles regarding the deaths of contractors in the employ of the CIA. As 
reviewed in earlier sections, the initial stages of the conflict saw the CIA work closely with Northern 
Alliance fighters to topple the Taliban. As the war progressed, and morphed into a hunt for al-Qaeda 
figures, the CIA turned to contractors, mainly former SF personnel, in an effort to maintain and 
increase operational tempo.219 On October 25th, 2003, two of these contractors were killed in an 
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ambush near Shkin, in the eastern part of the country.220 Very little additional information exists 
regarding the incident, or other CIA contractors operating during this time, thus it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions on the extent to which the CIA used contractors in combat operations.  
 
 Overall, the difficulty in obtaining information on contractor figures during this period prevents 
a complete analysis of the issue. The main hiring organizations did not follow existing guidelines and 
requirements for reporting and oversight, and quite simply could not accurately determine exactly who 
they had hired, for how much, for what exact purpose, and whether the contract winner succeeded in 
their duties. In the case of the CIA, almost zero information is available in the public domain, with 
journalistic reports of specific incidents the only current source available. Although this highlights that 
contractors were being used in combat roles, it does not provide broader insight into numbers or 
figures. In a case where a company was contracted to provide 'armed services', and information is 
available, in the case of DynCorp and their State Department contract, for example, no additional 
verifiable information is available in terms of the size of the force actually used in Afghanistan.  
 
  4.2.2 Later Stages of the Conflict 
 
 As the conflict progressed, and many, most crucially the U.S. Congress, became more 
conscious of the use of contractors in Afghanistan (and Iraq), increased focus was brought to bear on 
the issue. While the incident in Nisour Square, involving the killing 17 Iraqi civilians by Blackwater 
guards, is considered to be the event which sparked greater collective interest in PMCs in general, this 
also increased focus on Afghanistan.221 Among other things, this allowed for a more comprehensive, if 
not complete, picture of exactly how many contractors were actually working in Afghanistan. The 
majority of this information comes from the DOD; as compared to the other agencies employing armed 
and unarmed contractors, they have presented the most complete data sets to date.  
 
 Beginning in the summer of 2007, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) started releasing 
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quarterly reports on the contractors in their employ in both Iraq and Afghanistan.222 From these reports 
analysts could begin to track the fluctuations in numbers of contractors used by the DOD in 
Afghanistan on a consistent basis. These reports were also the primary method by which contractor 
activity in Afghanistan would be tracked by the DOD, until the SPOT (Synchronized Predeployment 
and Operational Tracker) system became active, which due to delays will likely not occur until late 
2011.223 On the one hand, this was a positive development in terms of contractor statistics; it was the 
first time one of the main hiring agencies attempted to consistently and accurate aggregate information 
on the contractors it employed in Afghanistan. However, there are a number of issues with the data 
within the reports. The GAO, for example, stated in October 2010 that the reports represented "only a 
rough approximation of the number of contractors and therefore should not be relied upon for precise 
analysis."224 Despite these concerns, it is currently the most complete data set available, and at a 
minimum provides guidance on certain trends. 
 
 The findings of these aggregated quarterly reports highlight a number of themes. The first is 
that inevitably, the presence of contractors increased along with the surge in U.S. military personnel 
into Afghanistan. As U.S. troop numbers increased from just above 20,000 in September 2007 to nearly 
100,000 in December 2010, contractor figures saw a similar increase, from around 30,000 in September 
2007 to a peak of nearly 120,000 in March 2010, before dropping to as low as 70,000 by December of 
that same year.225 Of these figures, by 2010 roughly 14% of these contractors were performing 'security 
functions'226. Reporting that there were 70,599 contractors employed by the DOD in December of 
2010, 20,874 of these were U.S. citizens, 15,503 third country nationals, and 34,222 Afghan citizens.227 
                                                
222  For a list of all quarterly reports, please see: http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/CENTCOM_reports.html.  
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This means of the entire contingent of contractors, 51% were local nationals, who while significantly 
higher than Iraq (15% for the same period), is markedly lower than the corresponding figure in 
September 2008, which was 83% of all contractors.228 There are a number of explanations for this 
fluctuation, mainly being the difficulty the DOD has in obtaining this information (as highlighted by 
the GAO), due to the fluid nature of the hiring and firing of local nationals for specific projects.229 
 
 CENTCOM also distinguishes between what it calls 'PSC' (private security contractor) 
personnel, and non-PSC contractors in its quarterly reports. Interestingly, in its early quarterly reports, 
it would distinguish between armed and unarmed PSC personnel; in later reports it did not.230 From 
2007, a relatively stable number of around 4,000 'PSCs' were employed by the DOD; this number had 
moved up to 17,814 by Q4 in 2010, with a rapid spike beginning around Q3 2009.231 The reasons for 
this rapid increase (50% increase, from 5,165 to 10, 712, in between Q3 and Q4 2009 alone232) are 
identified by CENTCOM as due to the 'decentralized expansion of operations'.233 
 
 As indicated, it is difficult to extrapolate similar figures for the State Department or USAID, the 
two other major employers of security contractors. Although required to input information via the 
SPOT system, there is no evidence that this is done consistently, or includes all Afghan personnel, as 
the fluid employment nature of host country nationals makes tracking this information difficult.234 
Information available from USAID indicates that they have allocated over $6.7 billion in contracts 
since commencing activities in Afghanistan in 2002, and as of 2009 had over 20,000 'implementing 
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personnel', the term used for contractors, 19,000 of these being Afghan nationals.235 They give no 
indication as to what percentage of these perform security services or are armed. To highlight the 
difficulties in tracking and general confusion regarding the number of contractors, an investigation by 
the Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight in 2009 identified the number of USAID contractors to 
only be 14,000, while State had 3,600 contractors under their employ.236 They also noted however, 
"Due to problems with the completeness and accuracy of contractor personnel data, the total number is 
likely to be even higher."237 
 
 In terms of the makeup of companies, the majority tend to foreign owned, while a number of 
Afghan or Afghan/foreign partnerships are also active. Information gathered by an NGO in 2007 
indicates that there were 59 licensed and registered PMCs in Afghanistan at the time.238 Of these, 16 
were Afghan, 4 were an Afghan-international partnership, 21 American, 17 British, 19 other 
nationalities or partnerships, and 13 which could not be determined.239 As of 2010, research by the 
CRS indicated that there were only 52 registered companies, although figures from both sources may 
be incomplete or inaccurate due to the challenges in reporting and obtaining data.240 
 
 If there is any trend or theme present in the data on contractors in Afghanistan under U.S. 
employ from 2001-2010, it is that no single agency, oversight body, or anyone for that matter had a 
realistic idea of how many contractors there actually were. Despite various pieces of legislation, 
Congressional committees, internal and external review processes, and increased media attention, the 
fact was that the DOD, State Department and USAID never could accurately report how many 
contractors were under their employ. This makes analysis of trends or themes very difficult; the Special 
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Inspector General even saying in a 2010 audit that pre-2007 data was simply "too poor to be 
analyzed."241 As a result of this, specific conclusions regarding the facts, figures or statistics on 
contractors operating in combat or even non-combat roles can be difficult to draw regarding the early 
stages of the war.  
                                                
241  BBC, "U.S. Not Tracking Spending on Afghan Projects, Audit Says." BBC News, October 28, 2010, accessed 
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Chapter 5 - PMCs in Afghanistan - Combat Roles 
 
 This section will review the three main combat roles which PMC personnel played during the 
COIN campaign in Afghanistan from 2001-2010. These are static and mobile security, individual 
security and covert action. By far the most common form of PMC personnel engaging in combat with 
adversarial forces is via mobile and static security, in particular convoy security.242 While it is 
recognized that these provide the most instances of combat, there are a number of factors which must 
be acknowledged when assessing this statement. The first is that the information regarding occurrences 
of combat during static site or convoy defense is much more readily available; as it is the DOD who 
employs contractors on a larger scale for these services (information from the DOD also being more 
accessible than information from State or USAID, as indicated.). Secondly, in terms of covert action, 
very little information, or even acknowledgment of the roles PMCs play in this aspect exist in the 
public domain. Therefore information on PMCs involvement in covert action is largely reliant on 
journalist reports, almost entirely cloaked in anonymity and unverifiable information. As a result, the 
majority of this section will focus on convoy and static site security.  
 
  5.1 Mobile (Convoy) Security 
 
 Afghanistan is a nation of harsh geography, with desolate stretches of desert intersected with 
various mountain ranges. Keeping a dedicated COIN campaign supplied, including over 200 U.S./ISAF 
FOB's in various, generally isolated areas of the country is a monumental task. In fact, U.S. military 
commanders call it 'the most complex logistical operation' it has ever undertaken.243 With hostile 
neighbors in Iran and Turkmenistan, along with politically unstable ones such as Pakistan and 
Tajikistan, supplying U.S. troops is a difficult and costly effort. The primary means by which this 
occurs is by truck, and since 2008, specifically the HNT (Host Nation Trucking) contract.244 This $2.16 
billion dollar contract uses eight different companies to transport over 70% of DOD supplies in 
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Afghanistan.245 A wide ranging investigation by the U.S. House of Representatives made a number of 
jarring discoveries regarding the use of contractor personnel, in particular armed contractors, as part of 
the HNT contract.246 A number of key findings emerge from this report which have a particular 
relevance to contractors engaging in combat activities, and massive implications for the COIN effort 
overall. Two in particular will be addressed in this section, the first being the conversion of 'warlords' 
and their militias into PMC actors, and the second the inadvertent funding of the Taliban via the HNT 
contract. 
 
  5.1.1 Host Nation Trucking 
  
 As emphasized, information regarding PMCs in combat in Afghanistan is difficult to obtain. 
The extensive investigation by the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs into the 
HNT however, provides fascinating insight into the world of convoy security by contractor personnel. 
Security wise, the contract is clear, stating: "Contractor is responsible for all security."247, while giving 
guidelines that each contractor must provide two security vehicles for every five trucks.248 With 
estimated 6,000-8,000 trucks in transit per month during this time period, the HNT called for a massive 
amount of security personnel and operations in order to keep the convoys safe.249 In 2008-2009 the IED 
and ambush threat had increased significantly on Afghanistan's roads, with over 14,000 record IED 
incidents occurring from 2007-2009.250 This meant that the likelihood and occurrence of contractors 
defending these convoys engaging in combat was rather high.  
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 The investigation found a number of themes worth highlighting in terms of the contractors 
engaging in combat. 
 
 5.1.2 The Use of Warlords and Militia 
  
 The report found that the primary source of security contractors protecting convoys under the 
HNT were in fact recruited and employed under the auspices of various regional warlords.251 One 
particular commander guards roughly 3,500 trucks per month on Highway 1, the main transportation 
route between Kabul and Kandahar, nearly half of all trucks in the HNT effort.252 In a society in which 
strength and influence is generally wielded through tribal militias, many feel that 'warlords' simply 
transfer their militias into the form of PMCs in order to assign legitimacy and enrich themselves 
through contracts.253 In one example, a warlord known as Commander 'Ruhullah' would operate under 
the license of PMC Watan Risk Management254, generally escorting 200-400 trucks at a time from 
Kabul to Kandahar, with his men traveling alongside and among the convoy trucks, often armed with 
RPG's and heavy machine guns, despite regulations limiting contractors to weapons no more powerful 
than an assault rifle.255 A number of other 'warlord' figures also control various PMCs in charge of 
convoy security; these include Matiullah Khan (Urguzan), Abdul Razziq (Chaman-Spin Boldak), Pacha 
Khan Zadran (Paktia and Khost) and a number of others.256 
 
 The practical effect of these men controlling PMCs who protect convoys is clear. Without 
paying them, the security of convoys could not be guaranteed. Paradoxically, in many of these cases, 
the convoys would not only come under increased attack from the Taliban and other insurgents, but 
also from the PMCs themselves.257 Although no set of 'comprehensive incident data'258 exists, a number 
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of HNT contractors were clear that they faced significant additional risk if they had not paid a specific 
warlord in his area of operations for protection, even getting 'shot up'259 on the few times they 
attempted to provide their own security.260 
 
 An incident in 2010 provides the best example of the influence these local warlords have. After 
contractors under the employ of Watan Risk and Compass Integrated Security Solutions fired on local 
villagers in Wardak Province in May of 2010, the two companies were banned from operating between 
Kabul and Kandahar, beginning Monday, May 10.261 Starting that day, convoys leaving Kabul, using 
their own security or other alternative providers, came under some of the heaviest and sustained attacks 
of the year, with the pace of attacks and ambush only easing upon the reinstatement of Watan on May 
18th.262 
 
 Actual data on combat incidents during convoys is difficult to obtain; there is little evidence the 
trucking companies or PMCs hired to protect them kept such data. Therefore is difficult to determine 
the rate and frequency of such incidences, and reports on them vary widely. Commander Ruhullah for 
example claimed in one interview that he had lost 450 men in firefights with the Taliban while 
guarding convoys, and regularly spent over $1.5 million on ammunition alone per month.263 On the 
other hand, two trucking companies employed under the HNT claimed that collectively they had only 
lost 11 trucks over a one year period, out of over 25,000 missions.264 Another truck company owner 
attested that he had lost 119 trucks (out of 1,000) and had 21 drivers kidnapped since 2009.265 
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Attempting to provide further clarity is the DOD, who for example reported that from June 2008-March 
2009, 260 PMC personnel were killed on duty, 188 of these (72%) killed while providing convoy 
security.266 The discrepancies are a reminder of the difficulties in obtaining accurate, unbiased data on 
any number of aspects of contractors in Afghanistan. 
 
 5.1.3 The Funding of the Taliban 
  
 The second major finding relevant to this particular study, and a finding that will be echoed in 
later sections, is that U.S./ISAF forces are in fact indirectly funding the Taliban via the HNT 
contract.267 Through various reports, interviews and emails reviewed by the committee, they found 
ample evidence that the Taliban regularly extorted varying amounts of money along the transport 
routes, with some estimates putting it at nearly 10% of the HNT contract itself.268 Various individuals 
involved in the HNT process corroborated this claim, indicating at various times that PMC 
commanders regularly paid off, or even colluded with Taliban forces.269 One security consultant 
interviewed by the committee noted that "I have yet to find a security company that doesn't rely on 
payoffs to the Taliban."270  
 
 The results of this are obvious; by indirectly paying the Taliban through the extortion of 
trucking companies and the PMCs hired to protect them, the U.S./ISAF is in effect paying the Taliban 
to fight them. This clearly undermines the overall COIN effort, a theme which will be discussed further 
at the conclusion of this section.  
 
  5.2 Static Security 
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 Analyzing the use of PMCs conducting static or fixed installation, security in Afghanistan 
brings up a number of the same issues highlighted in the section on convoy security; mainly that 
consistent, reliable data is not publicly available on a large scale. A number of investigations and 
reports however, similar to mobile security, have shed light on the practical realities of using PMCs in 
Afghanistan to secure fixed assets, generally FOBs, airstrips, embassy's/consulates, and various other 
static installations. This section will explore a number of the themes present in the use of PMCs to 
guard static sites, by analyzing a number of these reports and investigations. 
 
 The most prominent investigation into the use of PMCs for static security was undertaken by 
the Committee on Armed Services (CAS) of the U.S. Senate. Beginning research in 2009, the 
Committee aimed to obtain an understanding of how PMCs were utilized by U.S./ISAF forces in 
Afghanistan. Reviewing thousands of pages of documents provided by the DOD, State Department, 
USAID, PMCs themselves, as well as numerous interviews, the result is the most comprehensive view 
available to the public on PMC activities in Afghanistan.271 Its findings echo many of those found in 
the previous study completed by the House of Representatives on the HNT contract, mainly that PMCs 
were funneling money directly to warlords, including those with direct links to the Taliban and other 
insurgent groups.272 The report looked at two primary case studies of static security, that of Shindand 
Airbase in Herat province, and Police training center in Adraskan, north of Shindand. 
 
  5.2.1 Shindand Airbase 
 
 The report looks initially at the case of Shindand Airbase in Herat Province, not far from the 
Iranian border. In 2007, the company Environmental Chemical Corporation (ECC) was contracted by 
the DOD (via the Air Force) to complete a construction and expansion project at the airbase; the 
company in turn hired Armor Group North America to provide security for the project.273 Following the 
signing of the contract, expat personnel from Armor Group traveled to the base in order to begin hiring 
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personnel. After consulting U.S. Military team leaders at the site, it was determined that Armor Group 
would hire guards from forces loyal to two local warlords, Nadir Khan and Timor Shah.274 The 
company eventually employed around 30 men supplied by the two warlords, supported by a number of 
men from Kabul.275 Over the following months, the Committee found that the Armor Group guards 
were engaged in combat multiple times, including assassination attempts, IED attacks, and the eventual 
murder of Shah, in fact carried out by his fellow (and rival) warlord Nadir Khan.276 Despite the fact that 
one of the chief suppliers of guards to Armor Group had murdered the other chief supplier, no 
contractor oversight personnel were sent to the scene, no sanctions were taken against Khan, and none 
of his men were fired; they continued their guard duties as normal.277 
 
 Following this episode, another local warlord stepped into the void to contribute personnel to 
the site, Timor Shah's brother, Reza Khan.278 Around this time, U.S./ISAF forces in the area also 
became aware of the fact that Nadir Khan had close links to the Taliban, and was likely providing them 
with key intelligence regarding the defense of the base by Armor Group.279 Over the next few months, 
Armor Group and U.S./ISAF forces were presented with a number of challenges regarding the guard 
force, including an escalating feud between Nadir Khan and Reza Khan, the seizing of weapons from 
Reza Khan's militia by ANA and ANP forces, and identifying increased links between both 
commanders and the Taliban.280 These came to head on August 21, 2008, when a combined U.S./ISAF 
and Afghan force raided a compound which was hosting a meeting including Reza Khan, and a number 
of other Taliban commanders. The raid, which would hit international headlines in the following days, 
killed an estimated 80 people following airstrikes, although U.S./ISAF forces insisted the death toll was 
much lower, with the Taliban providing misinformation as part of its propaganda campaign.281 
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Relevant to Armor Group was the fact that Reza Khan and six other guards employed by Armor were 
all killed in the raid, with almost the entire remaining guard force abandoning their posts at the airbase 
following their deaths.282 
 
  5.2.2 Adraskan National Training Center (NTC) 
  
 In January of 2008, the DOD awarded a $7 million contract to EOD Technology (EODT) to 
provide security for the building of a new ANP NTC in the village of Adraskan, in Herat province.283 
Upon initially arriving at the scene, EODT expat hiring personnel were immediately beset by many of 
the issues found by Armor Group in Shindand, mainly inter-tribal feuding related to who would be 
hired by the company.284 Eventually, EODT hiring personnel worked out deals with local warlords, but 
again encountered similar issues, mainly the use of personnel associated with the Taliban, including 
individuals who had been fired from Armor Group contracts for the same reason, and affiliation with 
various other warlords associated with insurgent groups, and even a 'hostile foreign government.'285 
 
 Aside from these two case studies investigated by the CAS, a number of other companies and 
contracts were noted in the report. What the CAS found continues a number of the key themes 
identified in the overall report. These themes echo those found by the House in their study of the HNT, 
mainly that local warlords and powerbrokers have formalized themselves into registered PMCs, in 
order to obtain contracts and thus maintain power and influence, and there are clear links between 
PMCs employed by U.S./ISAF forc s and the Taliban.  
 
  5.3 Personal Protective Services (PPS) 
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 In addition to mobile and static security, a personal protective service (PPS) was a key function 
outsourced to PMCs and contractors during the conflict in Afghanistan. Although more highly focused 
in terms of the contracts offered and the PMCs who won them than mobile or static security, studying 
this aspect of PMC activities also runs into many of the same issues as the previous sections. The 
primary inhibitor is the fact that the State Department was the primary employer of PMCs assigned to 
protect individuals, under its Worldwide Personal Protective Services contracts. As seen in previous 
sections, the State Department has proved the most reluctant to divulge information on its dealings with 
PMCs. Through the WPPS contracts, the State Department hired three separate PMCs beginning in 
2002 to undertake activities related to various PPS services, including the protection of the U.S. 
Ambassador to Afghanistan, as well as that of Afghan president Hamid Karzai; these were DynCorp286, 
Blackwater and Triple Canopy.287  
  
 The initial iterations of the WPPS contracts were given to DynCorp, and called for the 
establishment of the Karzai Protective Detail (KPD), at the cost of nearly $50 million to the State 
Department.288 In January 2003, this was extended to include the creation of the Ambassador Protective 
Detail (APD), later changed to the Embassy Protective Detail (EPD).289 The contract called for 
employees to be highly trained and experienced with PPS work, as there was a high likelihood of 
DynCorp's employees to be engaged in combat at some stage or another.290 This also meant that much 
of the contractors hired for the KPD and APD details would be not be Afghan nationals, but rather 
those with specific experience in U.S. Special Forces or law enforcement, with a focus on PPS.291 
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Although detailed incident reports regarding the DynCorp KPD engaging in combat activities are not 
available to the public, a number of high profile incidents brought attention to the company’s activities 
in Afghanistan.  
 
 Although there were multiple assassination attempts of President Karzai during his tenure292, 
the most prominent incident occurred on August 24th, 2004, when a massive car bomb destroyed the 
headquarters of DynCorp in Kabul, killing 10, including three American employees of the company.293 
In addition to this, the company consistently came in for criticism over the course of their tenure for the 
actions of the DynCorp personnel assigned to the KPD.294 This included overly aggressive behavior, 
even towards U.S./ISAF military forces and journalists, as well as drunkenness and soliciting 
prostitution.295 One European diplomat in Kabul even indicated the August bombing was "specifically 
targeted at the presidential guard, which is odious."296 
 
 In 2005, the WPPS contract was extended, and renamed WPPS II, and now assigned three 
companies, DynCorp, Blackwater and Triple Canopy, to conduct PPS services in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Jerusalem.297 In February of 2006, a further task order was granted specifically to Blackwater for the 
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APD and other related PPS functions required by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.298 Although Blackwater, 
and later Armor Group, who took over protection of the embassy in 2007299, faced similar issues 
related to the behavior of their employees in Kabul300, the State Department and other investigating 
bodies have noted: "No one under the protection of personal security specialists has been injured or 
killed as a consequence of hostile actions."301 Although the protection and safety of its personnel and 
that of Hamid Karzai are clearly the State Departments primary priority, the ignorance of what effects 
these PMCs have on the overall COIN effort in Afghanistan can cause further issues. 
 
 5.4 Covert Action 
  
 Perhaps the most controversial and high profile theme related to PMCs in combat in 
Afghanistan is also that with the least amount of available information. PMC personnel operating 
alongside U.S. and Afghan national forces during covert action missions is a topic which has garnered 
coverage by various media outlets, throughout the duration of th  conflict. However, due to the nature 
of covert action and the inherent secrecy and sensitivity involved, no first hand information is available 
in the public sphere regarding these operations. This lack of information prevents any sort of analysis, 
although the below section details some of the stories emanating from journalists regarding PMCs 
involved in covert action.  
 
 There are a number of high profile examples of news reports regarding PMCs engaging in 
covert action alongside U.S. forces. Perhaps the most notable was the NY Times story regarding 
Blackwater's involvement in a secret CIA assassination program in the early stages of the war, around 
2004.302 A further example was in 2010, when the story broke that a DOD official had initiated a 
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program which hired former SF operatives as contractors to help track and kill insurgents.303 Various 
other examples have also been highlighted, including private actors capturing and interrogating 
suspected militants304, as well as contractors being used to load munitions onto drones which then 
targeted militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.305 
 
 It has yet to be seen whether the U.S. government bodies that have investigated and reported on 
various other aspects of PMCs in combat in Afghanistan will also look into these incidents. However, 
without further information available in the public domain, analysis of these events and the impacts 
they may have had on the overall COIN effort would be pure speculation.  
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  Chapter 6 - Key Themes & Conclusions 
 
 In reviewing the information available on PMCs in combat in Afghanistan, a number of key 
themes come to light. Primarily, there is a glaring dearth of information on PMCs and their activities in 
Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2007, little reliable information exists detailing the number of contracts, 
number of personnel employed by contractors or effectiveness of PMCs carrying out their duties to 
their employers, these being the DOD, State Department, USAID and the CIA. The primary cause of 
this is the overall failure of oversight mechanisms in place. Although there was an increased focus on 
implementing and improving these later in the war, many still existed prior to 2007-2008, and were 
simply ignored. This greatly affects study of the topic, but strictly limiting the information available for 
analysis. That being said, additional themes are identifiable through study of what is currently 
available; these being related to the overarching concept that PMCs engaging in combat activities had a 
negative effect on the overall COIN campaign.  
 
 6.1 General Failure of Oversight Mechanisms 
 
 One characteristic inherent in all of said agencies dealings with PMCs is the disregard for 
standard reporting and oversight mechanisms. Prior to the implementation of SPOT, each agency was 
beholden to their own internal reporting and oversight requirements, many of which they often ignored, 
and in some cases seemed to not even exist. What is clear is that for much of the initial stages of the 
conflict, these agencies had little understanding of the amount of PMCs and contractors employed by 
them in Afghanistan. For example, USAID written policy required that it provide "a transparent 
monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that contractors are meeting their goals and staying on 
schedule."306 However, in response to a journalist FOIA request on providing a specific number of 
contractors employed by the agency, they replied: "USAID does not aggregate the kind of information 
for which you are asking."307 It is difficult to envision how they could determine if contractors were 
meeting their goals if they did not know how many they actually employed. 
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 Even in the later stages of the war, when public and Congressional pressure began to force more 
accountability onto these agencies, little improved. The SPOT system, designed to provide a uniform, 
central location for entering PMC and contractor data for all agencies involved in contracting has not 
been effective. A 2009 GAO report found that even though implemented, the agencies themselves often 
simply did not use the system.308 In one report, the PMC Compass Integrated Security Solutions told 
Congressional investigators that they had 1,672 Afghan nationals working for them under DOD 
contracts, and to that point had entered the details for 2,070 in total into SPOT309. When verified in the 
system itself, investigators found that Compass had only entered information for 196.310 Armor Group, 
whose activities are detailed in previous sections, did not have a single individual entered into the 
SPOT system for its Afghanistan operations as of May 2010.311 
 
 This lack of reporting and oversight extends to PMCs in combat as well. In addition to baseline 
information such as the number of contracts, companies and employees, basic regulations require 
agencies to report all instances of combat. For example, the DOD is required to, via their contractors, 
track: "1. The injury or death of PSC personnel, 2. The discharge of weapons at or by such personnel, 
3. The injury, death or damage of property caused by the actions of such personnel, 4. Incidents of 
alleged misconduct."312 In practice, this rarely occurred, as DOD had little presence or insight into the 
operations of their contractors whatsoever. While the DOD did begin to attempt to track incidents and 
casualty figures later in the conflict, many of the factors already identified prevent a thorough and 
complete picture of either category. 
 
 6.2 PMC Operations Negative Impact on Aspects of COIN Campaign 
 
 This theme is likely the most noteworthy, and present, in terms of what can be derived from the 
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information available on PMCs in combat in Afghanistan. In nearly every Congressional committee or 
oversight body report, NGO/think tank investigation, and news article related to PMCs in combat, 
some aspect of this theme is highlighted. It is clear that the use or misuse of PMCs in Afghanistan has 
undermined aspects of the COIN campaign undertaken by U.S./ISAF/Afghan forces to various extents. 
This takes a number of forms, three of which will be highlighted here. 
 
 6.2.1 Warlords as PMCs   
 
 "Warlords in Kandahar had been allowed to build up militias that they claimed were private 
security companies, and these private security companies were a creation of the international 
community." - U.K. Major General Nick Carter313 
 
 The primary way in which the use of PMCs in combat functions undermines the overall COIN 
campaign is the enabling and exacerbation of existing tribal, ethnic and regional divisions through the 
employment of local warlords and their militias as PMCs. This is a theme that is highlighted across 
nearly all forms of research and reporting on PMCs in Afghanistan. As noted, Afghanistan differs 
significantly from Iraq in that the vast majority of PMC personnel, up to 93% in 2011, are Afghan 
nationals.314 These men employed by PMCs do not come from a vacuum, they bring along their 
existing tribal and ethnic loyalties with them, and as seen in multiple reports, including that of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee315, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform316, the 
Institute for the Study of War317, and a number of others, their employment is facilitated by a warlord 
who usually controls a specific piece of territory.  
 
 As highlighted time and again, a local warlord uses money gained from obtaining U.S./ISAF 
contracts in order to maintain power and influence, thus exacerbating divisions between these militias, 
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the areas the control, and the central government. The basic conflict in any COIN campaign is the 
battle for legitimacy in the eyes of the population, between the government and insurgents. By funding 
and enabling the power and influence of local/tribal militias, U.S./ISAF forces are allowing them to 
compete with the central government for legitimacy, which will inevitably extend attempts to bring the 
campaign to a conclusion, peaceful or otherwise.  
 
 6.2.2 The Indirect Funding of the Taliban 
  
 Perhaps the most literal example of undermining the overall COIN campaign is the indirect 
funding of the Taliban, via extortion and protection payments made by PMCs, as cited by numerous 
committees and reports. First brought to mainstream attention through an investigation by The Nation, 
further inquiries found an extensive system of bribery and extortion implemented by local Taliban 
commanders, forcing PMCs to pay them to avoid attack.318 Although in the case of the HNT contract, 
the Afghan PMC leaders denied the charge, a significant amount of documentation, correspondence 
and interviews with various stakeholders in the contract confirmed that up to an estimated $1.6-
$2million dollars per-week was paid to the Taliban to ensure safe passage of convoys.319 
 
 In an even more extreme example, the cases of Armor Group and EODT, which culminated in 
the raid at Azizabad, show the extent to which PMCs are linked to the Taliban. In this case the heads of 
militias which later later became PMC personnel were shown to be members of the Taliban, allegedly 
providing intelligence on the areas and personnel they were supposed to guarding, and in the case of 
the Azizabad raid, actively engaging in combat with U.S./ISAF/ANA forces.320  
 
 There is unlikely to be a more straightforward way to undermine your own COIN campaign 
than by funding the insurgents you are attempting to defeat. The fact that U.S./ISAF forces effectively 
funded the operations of the insurgents opposed to them via PMCs is the result of a number of realities 
faced by coalition forces in the conflict. The first is the utter lack of oversight or awareness of the 
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details of PMC activity in Afghanistan, and especially when it comes to those PMCs affiliated with the 
HNT. Due to various contextual realities, U.S./ISAF forces have little choice but to pay those who hold 
sway over a particular area, regardless of their other affiliations. In one case already highlighted, 
refusal to pay a particular PMC resulted in the largest attacks on convoys leaving Kabul that year.321 In 
another case in Panshir Province, a local governor handpicked a force of local fighters to act as PMC 
personnel protecting a PRT. A contracting official then noted that "...if any other guard force or U.S. 
security force is used, the governor will eject the PRT from the valley."322 These realities then manifest 
themselves into the scenario whereby U.S./ISAF forces fund the insurgents they are fighting.  
 
 6.2.3 Relations Between PMCs and Local Populations 
  
 "Actions speak louder than words, and the locals see these drugged-out thugs with guns and 
trucks with 'The United States' painted on the side." - Lt. Col. David Abrahams, 2nd Battalion, 1st 
Infantry Regiment, 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Kandahar, referring to PMC personnel 
guarding U.S./ISAF convoys passing through civilian areas.323 
 
 "Some Americans think all Afghans are terrorists or insurgents; but if they keep killing 
civilians, I'm sure some Afghans will decide to become insurgents." - Mohammed Shafi, Afghan elder 
from Yaka Toot, Kabul, in reference to an incident in which American Blackwater guards killed two 
Afghan civilians, May 2009.324 
 
 The final theme in this section is another that emerges in nearly all reports on the the topic of 
PMCs in Afghanistan, but in a number of different ways. The way government forces and their allies 
are perceived by the local population is crucial to COIN efforts in any context. In the case of 
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Afghanistan, U.S./ISAF forces, combined with their Afghan counterparts, fight to win hearts and minds 
against an array of insurgent groups. Inevitably, PMC personnel are equated with the overall coalition 
force in the eyes of the local population regardless of how tenuous that connection may be. In the case 
of convoy and static security, many Afghan citizens do make the distinction between locally hired 
PMC actors and their U.S./ISAF employers. As noted in the report on the HNT by the House 
Committee for Oversight and Government Reform, "When a supply convoy of 300 trucks and 500 
heavily armed guards rolls down Highway 1 engaging in firefights with competitors, criminals and 
insurgents, the local population understands that it is an American convoy."325 Attempting to protect 
the population, and in doing so proving the legitimacy of the government, is a staple of any COIN 
campaign, but this is seriously undermined by reckless actions by PMC personnel. Naturally the 
Afghan population will not hold the individual contractor to account (and couldn't), but rather will 
equate such behavior with the overall U.S./ISAF/Afghan COIN effort.  
 
 Although the above refers to specifically combat-related actions by Afghan PMC personnel 
(generally), western PMC contractors have also contributed to a decidedly negative image of PMCs in 
Afghanistan. DynCorp, as mentioned previously, came under criticism for various transgressions while 
employed under the WPPS contract, and specifically the KPD. Blackwater was in an incident in which 
civilians were fired upon in Kabul326, while Paravant (a Blackwater subsidiary) removed over 500 
weapons from a ANP depot, even using a fictional characters name from the show 'South Park' in order 
to sign the weapons out.327 These types of incidents inevitably foster resentment towards the PMCs and 
by extension U.S./ISAF forces. Although it is difficult to gauge popular opinion from a quantitative 
point of view, one Swiss NGO was able to conduct various interviews with citizens of Afghanistan 
regarding PMCs in 2007328. Their findings confirmed that many Afghans make little distinction 
between PMC personnel and other security/military actors (U.S./ISAF/Afghan), they felt that PMCs in 
fact increased insecurity due to their poor behavior, heavy armament, and high profile, which attracted 
                                                
325  Ibid, Tierney, 46. 
 
326  August Cole, "U.S. Contractors Fired at Kabul Car." Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2009, accessed September 25, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124239900599924043.html. 
 
327  Spencer Ackerman, "Blackwater Took Hundreds of Guns from U.S. Military, Afghan Police." Washington Independent, 
February 23, 2011, accessed September 25, 2011, http://washingtonindependent.com/77476/blackwater-the-senate-and-
south-park.  
 
328  Ibid, Joras and Schuster.  
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insurgent attention, and that it was simply a way for warlords to maintain and increase their 
influence.329 Overall, it is clear that the actions of certain PMC actors have contributed to the 
undermining of the overall COIN effort in Afghanistan.  
 
 6.3 Conclusions 
  
 This thesis aimed to analyze the extent to which PMCs played combat roles as part of the 
overall U.S. COIN effort in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2010. A number of key themes were identified 
from the available literature. The primary theme regards the availability of information; because neither 
the PMCs nor U.S. government agencies who employed them recorded accurate and consistent 
information regarding their operations, it is difficult to draw comprehensive conclusions regarding 
PMCs use in combat. Further themes are generated from what information was available. These mainly 
focused on the perceived and actual effects of PMCs actions on the overall COIN campaign, 
specifically the arming and empowering of warlords, the indirect funding of the Taliban, and the 
negative overall perception of PMCs by the population of Afghanistan.  
  
 
 6.3.1 Summary of Work 
  
 The first chapter of this work introduced the research topic, as well as its focus, that of PMCs in 
Afghanistan. In addition to this, it clarified key terms, and identified the main sources of information 
regarding PMCs in combat, and some of the themes present in the available literature. The primary 
focus of the literature review was to highlight the strengths and weakness of various aspects of the 
current literature, as well as emphasized the primary source of information for this work, which were 
U.S. Government documents. 
 
 The second chapter introduced the history and relationship between contractors and the U.S. 
Military. It outlined the rise of the PMI, highlighting the various roles contractors have played, and 
specifically how the support roles contractors have traditionally undertaken can rapidly become combat 
                                                
329  Ibid, 37. 
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related due to the contextual factors of modern warfare. The chapter continued by highlighting the 
current main themes regarding contracting from a legal and policy standpoint. 
 
 Chapter three introduced the topic of the conflict in Afghanistan, and specifically legal and 
policy aspects of the COIN campaign, as well as the characteristics of the insurgency. 
 
 The fourth chapter specifically addressed the issue of PMCs in combat in Afghanistan, 
providing a more general introduction by covering the statistics available regarding PMCs, focusing on 
the the early and then later stages of the conflict. 
 
 The fifth chapter delves into PMCs engaging in combat through various functions, but 
specifically mobile, static and personal security, as well as covert action. It provides a number of 
examples taken mostly from U.S. Government reports, including congressional committees, oversight 
and watchdog groups, as well as investigative journalists, NGO's and academic researchers. From this, 
a number of themes are introduced. 
 
 Chapter seven reviews the main themes identified in the previous chapters. Four overall themes 
are identified; that a general failure of the oversight and reporting mechanisms regarding PMCs led to a 
significant lack of comprehensive data, and that a number of factors had a negative effect on various 
aspects of the COIN campaign. These included the funding of warlords and the Taliban, as well as 
negative perceptions of PMC personnel by the Afghan population.  
 
 6.3.2 Further Research 
 
 As indicated in earlier sections of this work, the topic of PMCs in general is underdeveloped, 
with academic analysis relatively sparse outside of a few major cases. In the case of PMCs in combat in 
Afghanistan, a number of contextual factors inhibit all relevant information from being available in the 
public sphere. That being said, there are a number of potential themes which deserve further scrutiny in 
the future.  
 
 As the conflict in Afghanistan comes to an eventual conclusion, individuals and documents will 
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be come available which are not currently, due to the ongoing insurgency. These will likely shed more 
light on PMC activities in country in general, with a corresponding increase in information on combat. 
Although it is clear that not much of this type of information was recorded by PMCs, or the 
government agencies employing them, any increased availability will be helpful for future scholars. In 
addition to this, it is likely that the government agencies themselves will make more information public 
by way of FOIA requests in the future. While it is unknown what types of documents will be available, 
and how heavily they will be redacted, they should provide more depth to the topic in general. 
 
 In terms of themes which researchers will likely confront, the most interest should likely focus 
on the results of contracting realities which occurred in Afghanistan. Specifically, to what extent the 
empowering and arming of warlords and militias has on the long term stability of Afghanistan, and the 
ability of the government in Kabul to maintain legitimacy. This approach will have clear implications 
not only for Afghanistan, but will also provide guidance for future U.S. interventions in foreign 
nations. Therefore it is likely researchers in both the civilian and government world will study this 
topic closely.  
 
 In addition to the above, a key topic for future analysis is the general failure of oversight and 
reporting mechanisms regarding PMCs. With such a blatant lack of understanding, coordination, 
oversight and responsibility in terms of the relationship between PMCs and government organizations, 
future situations of a similar nature will likely have far more scrutiny applied to them.  
 
 6.3.4 Final Comments 
 
 This thesis aimed to obtain the relevant facts regarding PMCs engaging in combat as part of the 
overall COIN campaign in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010. It did not aim to make generalizations 
regarding the morality, cost effectiveness or any other broad topic regarding PMCs; rather, it simply 
attempted to understand to what extent PMCs present in Afghanistan engaged in combat. A number of 
themes were found. Primarily, a clear and systematic misuse or ignorance of reporting and oversight 
mechanisms resulted in a general lack of information regarding PMCs in combat, whether that be from 
government organizations, PMCs or even contractor personnel themselves. From what information was 
available, mainly government investigations, supported by NGO and journalist reports, a number of 
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themes emerged. This mainly pointed to the continued undermining of the overall COIN campaign, 
through the funding of warlords, as well as the Taliban, and alienating the local population. It is too 
early to determine what long term effects these actions will have on the GIRoA's ability to maintain 
power and legitimacy.  
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